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                                                         ABSTRACT 
The International Salvage Union (ISU) believes that it is time to reconsider its provisions and 
amend the 1989 Salvage Convention to create a separate and distinct environmental salvage award. 
ISU is of the opinion that the present systems under the 1989 Salvage Convention and SCOPIC 
do not provide proper recognition of the salvor’s efforts in protecting the environment. 
 
For a long time, salvage was concerned with the principle of no cure no pay. In order to overcome 
this the 1989 Convention introduced the salvor’s skill and effort to minimize or prevent damage 
to the environment as a criteria for fixing rewards in terms of Article 13; and Article 14 which 
allows for a special compensation to be paid even where no property was saved provided there 
were efforts to protect the environment. Due to difficulties with Article 14 SCOPIC was 
introduced, which is a clause that can be incorporated under the LOF. This dissertation will 
critically analyze the ISU’s proposed amendments of the 1989 Salvage Convention and to consider 
whether this should be incorporated into the South African Wreck and Salvage Act, 1996. 
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                                CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1      Introduction  
Salvage is an ancient right which has been restricted to a reward for the saving of life and property 
at sea. This was according to the principle of “no pay no cure”, where salvors were successful in saving 
the ship or property they were awarded accordingly. However, should they fail to save the ship or property 
they will receive nothing.1 Therefore, the principle of traditional salvage failed to allow an environmental 
award in cases where no property was actually saved.2   
During the twentieth century, the world developed an environmental awareness in such a way that 
environmental concerns have been the centre of the development of the law of salvage and have 
shaped the Salvage Convention.3 In the 1960’s salvage rewards began to change because of the 
development of oil tankers and the increase of marine casualties in the 1960’s and 1970’s which 
resulted in huge pollution problems. For example, disasters such as the Torrey Canyon4, Atlantic 
Empress5 and Amoco Cadiz6 awakened environmental awareness in different States. 
When the 1989 Salvage Convention7 came into force its drafters recognized the need to protect the 
environment and introduced two changes to the law of salvage, Article 13 and Article 14. .Article 
13(1)(b) looks at the skill and effort of the salvors in preventing or minimizing damage to the 
environment as one of the factors to be taken into consideration when calculating a salvage 
reward.8 Article 14 provides for special compensation even when no property has been saved, but 
the fact that the salvor was involved in a salvage operation that threatened damage to the 
environment and thereby prevented or minimized damage to the environment is taken into 
                                                          
1 Brice Maritime Law of Salvage 5edn (2012) at 1. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Bishop “The Development of Environmental Salvage and Review of the Salvage Convention 1989” Tulane Maritime 
Law Journal (2012) 37 at 65-66. 
4 Torrey Canyon, United Kingdom, 1967. Available at: http://www.itopf.com/in-action/case-studies/case-
study/torrey-canyon-united-kingdom-1967/. Accessed on 10 August 2017.  
5 Atlantic Empress, West Indies, 1979. Available at: http://www.itopf.com/in-action/case-studies/case-
study/atlantic-empress-west-indies-1979/. Accessed on 10 August 2017.  
6 Amoco Cadiz, France, 1978. Available at: http://www.itopf.com/in-action/case-studies/case-study/amoco-cadiz-
france-1978/. Accessed on 10 August 2017. 
7  International Convention on Salvage (London 28 April 1989).  UNTS 1953 (International Salvage Convention).  
8 Article 13 (1) (b), International Salvage Convention of 1989.   
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consideration to compensate salvors for their effort.9 The 1989 Salvage Convention thus reduced 
the harshness of the principle of “no cure no pay”.10   
 
Due to the House of Lords decision in the Nagasaki Spirit case11 where the House of Lords held 
that “fair rates for the equipment, personnel actually and reasonably used in the salvage operation 
in Article 14 (3) meant a fair rate of expenditure and did not include an element of profit”12, Article 
14 was therefore replaced by the Special Compensation P&I Club Clause (SCOPIC) which 
introduced a simpler tariff based mechanism for calculating special compensation.13 This is a 
clause which can be voluntarily incorporated into a LOF contract.   
 
However, with regards to Article 14 “Special Compensation” in South Africa the Wreck and 
Salvage Act14 contradicts the House of Lords decision in the Nagasaki Spirit case15 and provides 
that Article 14 includes an element of profit having regard to the scope of work done and the 
prevailing market rate.16 
 
In 2007 the International Salvage Union (ISU) felt it time for change and put forward its proposal 
for an environmental salvage award which was followed in 2012 by ISU’s position paper on the 
1989 Salvage Convention. ISU believes that it is time to amend the 1989 Salvage Convention to 
create a separate and distinct environmental salvage award.17 ISU is of the opinion that the present 
systems under the 1989 Salvage Convention or a LOF incorporating SCOPIC do not provide 
proper recognition of the salvor’s efforts in protecting the environment.18 ISU recognizes that 
                                                          
9 Article 14, International Salvage Convention of 1989. 
10 Bishop op cit note 3 at 67. 
11 Semco Salvage & Marine Pte. Ltd.v Lancer Navigation Co Ltd. [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 323 (HL). (The Nagasaki Spirit). 
12 Ibid at 332. 
13 The Special Compensation P&I Clause (SCOPIC). Available at: http://www.marine-
salvage.com/documents/SCOPIC_Appendix_A_2014.pdf. Accessed on 10 August 2017. For the history of the clause 
see Bishop op cit note 3 at 69-87. 
14 The Wreck and Salvage Act 94 of 1996 (hereafter “the Wreck and Salvage Act”).  
15 The Nagasaki Spirit supra note 11. 
16 Ibid.  
17 The International Salvage Union Position Paper on the 1989 Salvage Convention at 1. Available at: 
http://www.marine-salvage.com/environmental/ISU%20Final%20Position%20Paper.pdf. Accessed on 10 August 
2017. See also: 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Salvage%20Convention/ISU%20Final%20Position%20Paper%20on%20E
nvironmental%20Salvage%20Awards%20April%202012.pdf. Accessed on … 
18 Ibid. 
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“SCOPIC works and that salvors in many cases are rewarded for protecting the environment by 
Article 13 (1) (b)”.19 However, ISU argues that both Article 14 and SCOPIC’s main objective is 
to save property; Article 14 does not include the element of profit and SCOPIC is limited to a 
standard bonus of 25% irrespective of the work achieved by a salvor. ISU further states that 
recently society has become more environmentally conscious and now protecting the marine 
environment comes before saving property20 and they feel that salvors are insufficiently paid for 
protecting the environment because both Article 14 and SCOPIC are a safety net and not a method 
of remuneration.21  
 
Ex-president Todd Busch then went on to give three reasons for their environmental salvage award 
proposal, firstly, he said that environmental issues are dominant in every salvage case. Secondly, 
that the current system under the 1989 Salvage Convention and where applicable SCOPIC do not 
take into account the degree of success obtained by the salvor in protecting the environment. 
Thirdly, that the salvage industry lacks funding.22  
 
The ISU’s environmental award proposal was opposed by the P&I Clubs and shipowners because 
they were happy with the present system. Khosla submits that “the salvage system works!”23  
 
It is submitted that the shipping industry must be careful to ensure that resistance to change is 
based on sound reasons and not simply because the industry has become too comfortable with how 
the current system works, because taking care of the environment is now a fundamental concern.    
 
                                                          
19 Busch Fair Rewards for Protecting the Environment- the Salvor’s Perspective, at 4. Available at: 
http://www.marine-salvage.com/media-information/conference-papers/fair-reward-for-protecting-the-
environment-the-salvors-perspective/. Accessed on 8 October 2017. See also Yearbook 2010 at 493-498 available 
at: http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Yearbooks/Yearbook%202010.pdf. Accessed on 8 October 2017. 
20 Wahi “Oil Spill in India 2016” a paper presented at the Oil Spill India 4th International Conference & Exhibition 
conference at JW Marroitt, Sahar, Mumbai, India on (11-12 August 2016).  Available at: http://www.marine-
salvage.com/media-information/conference-papers/oil-spill-india-2016/. Accessed on 8 October 2017. 
21 Busch Fair Rewards for Protecting the Environment- the Salvor’s Perspective, op cit note 19 at 4.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Khosla “Salvage Law-is it Working? Does it protect the environment?”  at 5. Available at: 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Salvage%20Convention/Salvage%20Environmental%20Salvage%20CMI
%20%20Kiran%20Khosla%20ICS%20%20Final.doc. Accessed on 10 October 2017. See also: CMI Yearbook 2010 at 
478-487 available at: http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Yearbooks/Yearbook%202010.pdf. Accessed on 8 
August 2017. 
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1.2   Study rationale  
Environmental salvage raises awareness of the importance of the environment and specifically 
whether salvors are also rewarded for the part that they play in saving the environment and have 
an incentive to invest in the industry and respond to casualties even when they are unlikely to earn 
a traditional salvage award.  This is an important issue to examine because the aim of the ISU 
proposal is to ensure that salvors are properly rewarded for protecting the environment while 
SCOPIC and Article 14’s main objective is to save property.  A separate environmental salvage 
reward may incentivize salvors and may help salvors to invest in better equipment and remain in 
business. Section 24 of the Constitution of the South Africa affords everyone the right to an 
environment which is not harmful to their health and also places an obligation on the State to take 
reasonable measures to protect the environment for present and future generations.24  
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to critically analyze the ISU’s proposed amendments of the 1989 
Salvage Convention and to consider whether this should be incorporated into the South African 
Wreck and Salvage Act.  
 
1.3   Methodology   
The dissertation has been conducted using desktop research, based on relevant international 
conventions, South African legislation, relevant case law, and journal and internet articles. 
 
1.4   Research questions 
1. How did environmental concerns shape the salvage awards payable under the 1989 Salvage 
Convention and the LOF? 
• Article 13 
• Article 14 
• SCOPIC. 
2. Why does ISU believe it is time for the introduction of an environmental salvage award? 
3. What is ISU’s proposal for an environmental salvage award? 
• How is the damage to the marine environment going to be defined? 
                                                          
24 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.section 24.  
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• What type of damage should be taken into account? 
• Who should pay for such awards? 
• How are such awards going to be calculated or assessed? 
4. Whether ISU’s proposal for an environmental salvage award should be incorporated into 
the South African Wreck and Salvage Act, 1996? 
 
1.5   Chapter Outline 
This dissertation is structured as follows: 
Chapter one provides a brief introduction of the topic, the study rationale and purpose, the research 
questions and the chapter outline of this study. 
Chapter two looks at the historical background and it will discuss the provisions of the Salvage 
Convention governing salvage awards under Article 13, and special compensation under Article 
14. This discussion will therefore highlight where relevant amendments have been made to the 
Salvage Convention in South Africa in the Wreck and Salvage Act.  This chapter will also examine 
the Nagasaki Spirit case25 and consider the relevant provisions of SCOPIC. 
Chapter three will discuss the ISU proposal and the reasons given by ISU for proposing an 
environmental salvage award. It will also discuss the proposed amendments to the 1989 Salvage 
Convention and the issues regarding the assessment of such an award because an environmental 
salvage award cannot be quantified. 
Chapter four will discuss the constitutional and legal framework governing environmental rights 
and protection in South Africa. This chapter will look at section 24 of the Constitution, the National 
Environmental Management Act (NEMA),26 National Environmental Management: Integrated 
Coastal Management Act (NEMICMA),27 the Wreck and Salvage Act and case law. 
Chapter five will provide a summary of the findings, recommendations and the final conclusion.                     
 
                                                          
25 The Nagasaki Spirit supra note 11. 
26 Act 107 of 1998 
27 Act 24 of 2008 
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                           CHAPTER 2: SALVAGE LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
2.1   Introduction  
Salvage is an ancient right which for a very long time has been concerned with the saving of life 
and property. The earliest laws regulating salvage can be found in the ancient Rhodian maritime 
code.28    In terms of Article 2 of the Brussels Convention29 of 1910 the salvors needed to be 
successful in saving property in order for them to be awarded a salvage reward, but if they failed 
to save property they would receive nothing.30 This is called the principle of “no cure no pay” and 
it was regarded as the cornerstone of the law of salvage.  
In the 1960’s salvage rewards began to change as the world developed an “environmental 
conscience”. The development of oil tankers and the increase of marine casualties in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s gave birth to a huge problem- pollution. 
In 1967 the world witnessed its first large disaster, the Torrey Canyon31 incident. This is the 
incident which awakened an environmental consciousness in different States.32 This incident 
triggered the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,33 which makes 
                                                          
28 Brice Maritime Law of Salvage 2edn (1993) at 5. See also: Gengan From Rhodian Law to Lloyds Open Form 2000 
An analysis of the development of marine salvage law with special focus on the impact of oil pollution and the role 
of the salvor (2003). (Dissertation submitted for LLM, University of Natal). 
29 The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law respecting Assistance and Salvage at Sea 
(Brussels, 23 September 1910). 
30 Article 2: “Every act of assistance or salvage which has had a useful result gives a right to equitable 
remuneration. No remuneration is due if the services rendered have no beneficial result. In no case shall the sum to 
be paid exceed the value of the property salved.”  
31 Torrey Canyon, United Kingdom, 1967. Available at: http://www.itopf.com/in-action/case-studies/case-
study/torrey-canyon-united-kingdom-1967/. Accessed on 10 August 2017.   Another disaster was the Amoco Cadiz, 
France, 1978. Available at: http://www.itopf.com/in-action/case-studies/case-study/amoco-cadiz-france-1978/. 
Accessed on 10 August 2017. On the 16th of March 1978, the tanker Amoco Cadiz ran aground in the coast of 
Brittany spilling 223,000 tonnes of crude oil and 4,000 of bunker oil. In this case salvors were not rewarded for 
their effort of preventing damage to the environment they were in fact sued for their efforts. This is one of the 
disasters which led to the decision to replace the 1910 Brussels Convention and the introduction of LOF80. See 
also: Gengan From Rhodian Law to Lloyds Open Form 2000 An analysis of the development of marine salvage law 
with special focus on the impact of oil pollution and the role of the salvor (2003). (Dissertation submitted for LLM, 
University of Natal) at 65-72 for a detailed discussion of both the incidents. 
32 Storgards “Coastal State Intervention in Salvage Operations: Obligation and Liability Towards the Salvor” (2012) 
(Master's thesis, Universitetet i Tromsø) at 9.  
33 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) (Brussels, 29 November 1969) which 
together with the 1971 International Convention on the International Establishment of a Fund for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND) and protocols provides for compensation for damages caused by oil pollution 
from oil tankers.   
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provision for compensation for damage caused by oil pollution from oil tankers.  On 18 March 
1967, the Torrey Canyon ran aground and spilled 119,000 tons of crude oil. Salvors tried 
everything to reduce the amount of oil and prevent damage to the environment but they failed. The 
British Government then gave orders for the Torrey Canyon to be bombarded with the hope of 
burning the remaining oil. However, this measure was unsuccessful because it did not prevent the 
oil from causing pollution and killing thousands of sea birds and threatening the lives of many 
people. Salvors were not rewarded for their efforts in the Torrey Canyon incident because they 
failed to save property.     
Again in 1978 the world witnessed another disaster when the Atlantic Empress34 and the Aegean 
Captain collided and both vessels began to leak oil and caught fire. With regards to the Aegean 
Captain salvors were able to successfully tow it to safety and they were accordingly compensated 
for the property they saved, but with the Atlantic Empress the salvors were instructed to tow the 
vessel 300 miles offshore where the vessel was ripped apart by explosions and sank. Since no 
property was saved the salvors received nothing.  This was according to the principle of “no cure 
no pay”. 
As the result of the principle of “no cure no pay” salvors not only earned no reward, in fact they 
made a loss by attempting to assist the vessel, taking into consideration the cost of equipment and 
personnel used, and expenses incurred such as bunkers for their tugs and hiring additional 
equipment.  Therefore, salvors were reluctant to salve vessels if there was no chance of a successful 
salvage operation.  
In order to overcome this problem, the Lloyds Open Form (LOF) 1980 introduced an important 
change to the LOF salvage contract by reducing the harsh effect of the “no cure no pay” principle 
for the first time, and recognizing that preventing oil pollution of the environment was also 
important.35  This new provision of the LOF 1980 was regarded as a safety net and such award 
                                                          
34 Atlantic Empress, West Indies, 1979. Available at: http://www.itopf.com/in-action/case-studies/case-
study/atlantic-empress-west-indies-1979/. Accessed on 10 August 2017. See also: Gengan From Rhodian Law to 
Lloyds Open Form 2000 An analysis of the development of marine salvage law with special focus on the impact of 
oil pollution and the role of the salvor (2003). (Dissertation submitted for LLM, University of Natal) at 72-74. For a 
detailed discussion of the incident. 
35 Daines “The Lloyds Open Form and Special Compensation P&I Clause (SCOPIC)”.  Available 
at:  http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Salvage%20Convention/Graham%20Daines%20-
%20Scopic%20Paper.pdf.  Accessed on 12 September 2017 
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was paid only where the property being salved was an oil tanker laden or partly laden. This safety 
net award was only paid in the case of unsuccessful salvage operations, in which event the salvor 
could recover “reasonably incurred expenses plus an increment up to a maximum of 15% of 
expenses”.36 This award was to be paid by the ship owner alone or his liability insurer. Redgwell37 
submits that the LOF 1980 was not concerned with minimizing or preventing damage to the 
environment; it focused more on saving property at sea. 
In 1989 the International Salvage Convention38 was introduced. As stated in chapter one, when the 
1989 Salvage Convention came into force its drafters saw the need to protect the environment and 
introduced two changes to the law.  Article 13(1)(b) looks at the skill and effort of the salvors in 
preventing or minimizing damage to the environment as one of the factors to be taken into 
consideration when calculating a salvage reward.   Article 14 provides for special compensation 
even when no property has been saved, but there was a threat of damage to the environment. The 
1989 Salvage Convention thus reduced the harshness of the principle of “no cure no pay”.39   
However, due to the difficulties experiencing in applying article 14, highlighted by the Nagasaki 
Spirit case, the Special Compensation P & I Club Clause (SCOPIC) was introduced.  As stated in 
chapter one SCOPIC is a clause which can be incorporated into a LOF salvage contract by the 
parties.  Where SCOPIC is incorporated it replaces article 14 of the Salvage Convention. 
Although the salvors’ efforts to protect the environment are now taken into account when 
calculating the salvage awards, nevertheless the rewards are still restricted by the value of the 
salved property and are still paid by the ship and cargo pro rata to the value of property saved.40 
Storgards submits that although protection of the environment has been a primary concern in the 
                                                          
36 LOF 1980 clause 1 (a). Lloyd’s Open Form (LOF) 1980. Available at “Lloyd’s nautical Yearbook 1980” Lloyd’s of 
London Press, London, 1989. Available at: 
https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Search/Home?lookfor=Nautical+year+book++Lloyd%27s+nautical+yearbook&type=all
&limit%5B%5D=&submit=Find. Accessed on 10 November 2017. See: Gengan From Rhodian Law to Lloyds Open 
Form 2000 An analysis of the development of marine salvage law with special focus on the impact of oil pollution 
and the role of the salvor (2003). (Dissertation submitted for LLM, University of Natal) at 77-81. See also: Miller 
“Lloyd’s Standard Form of salvage Agreement – LOF 80: A Commentary” JMLC (1981) 12 (2) at 247.    
37 Redgwell “The Greening of Salvage Law” Marine Policy (1990)14(2) at 147. 
38 International Convention on Salvage (London, 28 April 1989). UNTS 1953. 
39 Bishop op cit note 3 at 67. 
40 Article 13 (1)(a)- (b), 13(2), International Salvage Convention of 1989.  
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development of laws relating to the powers of coastal states to intervene in pollution incidents, the 
law of salvage has not developed to the same extent.41  
In South Africa, the provisions of the 1989 Salvage Convention were enacted as a Schedule to the 
Wreck and Salvage Act.42   
This chapter will discuss the provisions of the Salvage Convention governing salvage awards 
under Article 13 (to be discussed in chapter 2.2), and special compensation under Article 14 (to be 
discussed in chapter 2.3).  That discussion will highlight where relevant amendments have been 
made to the Salvage Convention in South Africa in the Wreck and Salvage Act.  This chapter will 
then examine the Nagasaki Spirit case (to be discussed in chapter 2.4) and consider the relevant 
provisions of SCOPIC (to be discussed in chapter 2.5). 
 
2.2  Article 13 (1) of the 1989 Salvage Convention 
Article 13 of the International Salvage Convention of 1989 sets out the criteria for fixing the reward 
and provides as follows: 
“The reward shall be fixed with a view to encouraging salvage operations, taking into account the 
following criteria without regard to the order in which they are presented below:  
1. (a) the salved value of the vessel and other property;  
(b) the skill and efforts of the salvors in preventing or minimizing damage to the environment;  
(c)  the measure of success obtained by the salvor;  
(d)  the nature and degree of the danger;  
(e)  the skill and efforts of the salvors in salving the vessel, other property and life;  
(f)  the time used and expenses and losses incurred by the salvors;  
(g)  the risk of liability and other risks run by the salvors or their equipment;  
(h)  the promptness of the services rendered; 
(i) the availability and use of vessels or other equipment intended for salvage operations;  
(j)  the state of readiness and efficiency of the salvor's equipment and the value thereof. 
  
                                                          
41 Storgard op cit note 32 at 4-5. 
42 The Wreck and Salvage Act 94 of 1996.  
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2. Payment of a reward fixed according to paragraph 1 shall be made by all of the vessel and 
other property interests in proportion to their respective salved values. However, a State 
Party may in its national law provide that the payment of a reward has to be made by one 
of these interests, subject to a right of recourse of this interest against the other interests 
for their respective shares. Nothing in this article shall prevent any right of defence. 
  
3.  The rewards, exclusive of any interest and recoverable legal costs that may be payable 
thereon, shall not exceed the salved value of the vessel and other property.” 
 
Article 13 (1) (b) did not exist in the 1910 Brussels Convention.43 When the 1989 Salvage 
Convention came into force it introduced an additional factor, Article 13 (1) (b), which looks at 
“the skill and efforts of the salvor in preventing or minimizing damage to the environment” in 
order to encourage salvors to assist ships that threaten to cause damage to the environment. 
 
Article 13 (1)(b) is concerned with the threat of damage to the environment. However, for such an 
award to be successful the salvor must prove that he actually prevented or minimized damage to 
the environment.  
 
Any award recovered under Article 13 is paid by the ship and the cargo provided that the amount 
of the reward does not exceed the values of the salved property. Therefore, regardless of the 
salvor’s success in preventing or minimizing damage to the environment no reward is payable if 
property was not saved. This is in accordance with the no cure no pay principle. In the Nagasaki 
Spirit 44case the court held as follow: 
 
“…thus where the efforts of the salvor prevent or minimize damage to the environment 
and the salvage services are successful, he will obtain a larger salvage award against ship 
and cargo than he would otherwise have done. Moreover, there is no reason why an award 
should not be substantially larger in appropriate cases.”  
 
                                                          
43 Article 8(a) and (b) of the 1910 Brussels’ Convention listed the factors to be taken into consideration in the 
calculation of a salvage award. 
44 The Nagasaki Spirit case ([1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 44 (H.C)). 
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This criterion is concerned with the assessment of a conventional salvage reward but not with an 
award under Article 14 of “special compensation” which may take into account the skill and efforts 
of the salvors in preventing or minimizing damage to the environment in assessing the increment 
allowable under Article 14.2.45 
 
2.3 Article 14 of the 1989 Salvage Convention 
 
Article 14 of the International Salvage Convention of 1989 provides as follows: 
1. “If the salvor has carried out salvage operations in respect of a vessel which by itself or its 
cargo threatened damage to the environment and has failed to earn a reward under article 13 
at least equivalent to the special compensation assessable in accordance with this article, he 
shall be entitled to special compensation from the owner of that vessel equivalent to his 
expenses as herein defined. 
  
2. If, in the circumstances set out in paragraph 1, the salvor by his salvage operations has 
prevented or minimized damage to the environment, the special compensation payable by the 
owner to the salvor under paragraph 1 may be increased up to a maximum of 30% of the 
expenses incurred by the salvor. However, the tribunal, if it deems it fair and just to do so and 
bearing in mind the relevant criteria set out in article 13, paragraph 1, may increase such 
special compensation further, but in no event shall the total increase be more than 100% of the 
expenses incurred by the salvor.  
  
3.  Salvor's expenses for the purpose of paragraphs 1 and 2 means the out-of-pocket expenses 
reasonably incurred by the salvor in the salvage operation and a fair rate for equipment and 
personnel actually and reasonably used in the salvage operation, taking into consideration the 
criteria set out in article 13, paragraph 1(h), (i) and (j). 
  
4.  The total special compensation under this article shall be paid only if and to the extent that 
such compensation is greater than any reward recoverable by the salvor under article 13.  
 
                                                          
45 Brice 2ed op cit note 28 at 153 para 2-124. 
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5.  If the salvor has been negligent and has thereby failed to prevent or minimize damage to the 
environment, he may be deprived of the whole or part of any special compensation due under 
this article.  
 
6.  Nothing in this article shall affect any right of recourse on the part of the owner of the vessel.” 
 
Article 14 was introduced as a safety net by the 1989 Salvage Convention to try and overcome the 
harshness of the principle of “no cure-no pay”. In terms of Article 14(1), if a salvor was involved 
in a salvage operation which threatened damage to the environment the salvor will be entitled to 
special compensation.  
 
Special compensation is only claimed under Article 14(1) where the salvor has “failed to earn a 
reward under Article 13 at least equivalent to the special compensation”.  Attachment 1 of the 
1989 Salvage Convention provides as follows: 
 
“It is the common understanding of the Conference that, in fixing a reward under article 13 and 
assessing special compensation under article 14 of the International Convention on Salvage, 1989 
the tribunal is under no duty to fix a reward under article 13 up to the maximum salved value of the 
vessel and other property before assessing the special compensation to be paid under article 14.” 
 
Special compensation under the 1989 Salvage Convention is triggered if there has been a threat of 
damage to the environment. Damage to the environment is defined by Article 1(d) of the Salvage 
Convention as follows: 
 
“Damage to the environment means substantial physical damage to human health or to marine life 
or resources in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto, caused by pollution, 
contamination, fire, explosion or similar major incidents.” 
 
Bishop submits that the definition of “damage to the environment” came with a lot of problems. 
Although he argues that the general meaning of “damage to the environment” is clear, the problem 
comes when interpreting the word “substantial”.46 In early decisions, LOF arbitrators seemed to 
                                                          
46 Bishop op cit note 3 at 69. 
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follow the easy and simple interpretation of the word “accepting that a comparatively small 
quantity of oil could cause substantial damage if leaked into a particularly sensitive area.”47 
However, a good example of when a more strict approach has been taken is the Castor case 
discussed by Bishop.  Near the Cabo de Palos the Castor, which was loaded with 30,000 tons of 
petroleum and 100 tons of heavy fuel oil, was prevented from grounding by the efforts of salvors.  
In this case the Appeal Arbitrators were not convinced that the threat of damage to the environment 
was ‘substantial’ enough to give rise to special compensation under Article 14(2). In his opinion, 
the arbitrator held as follows: 
 
“I have considered as carefully as I can whether the damage to the birds and fish, which might have 
ensued from a grounding off Cabo de Palos, can be described as ‘substantial physical damage to 
marine life’ within the meaning of the Convention. ... [T]he scope for damage to birds, plankton 
and benthos and hence fish, in the event of a grounding off Cabo de Palos in winter, appears to me 
to have been very restricted indeed, notwithstanding the large volume of gasoline that might have 
escaped. Whilst there might have been some fatalities amongst birds and fish and some tainting of 
fish flesh, there was no evidence that the fish stocks or bird population would be significantly 
depleted by the limited damage which might have occurred. I have, therefore, found it difficult to 
conclude that there was a risk of ‘substantial physical damage to marine life’ off Cabo de Palos.”48 
 
The second problem is that the words “coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto” are not 
defined in the 1989 Salvage Convention.  Bishop points to this and indicates that although the 
word “coastal waters” may mean “territorial sea” under the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS)49 this is not certain as the words have not been interpreted by English 
Courts.50  Furthermore, it is not clear what is meant by “areas adjacent thereto”. 
 
For example, if a vessel runs into trouble on the high seas but is drifting towards coastal waters, it 
is unclear under the Salvage Convention whether a threat of “damage to the environment” exists 
immediately, or only when the vessel actually enters the coastal waters. 
                                                          
47Ibid. 
48 The text of the opinion is quoted in Bishop op cit note 3 at 70. 
49 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 3 (10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397) defines territorial 
sea as including the area within 12 nautical miles of the coast. 
50Bishop op cit note 3 at 70. 
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However, in South Africa damage to the environment is defined by section 2(7) of the Wreck and 
Salvage Act as: 
“Damage to the environment as defined in article 1 of the Convention shall for purposes of this 
Act, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, not be restricted to coastal or 
inland waters or to areas adjacent thereto, but shall apply to any place where such damage may 
occur.” 
 
This removes the second problem, because under South African law it is irrelevant where the vessel 
casualty occurs and where the threat of damage to the environment is expected to arise. 
However, it has not solved the first problem identified by Bishop, as the definition of “damage to 
the environment” still requires proof of “substantial” damage, as required by article 1 of the 
Salvage Convention.   
 
Bishop further states that once the special compensation has been activated, it must continue up 
until the end of the salvage operations in order to encourage salvors to remove the threat as soon 
as possible.51  For shipowners this could, however, mean that they end up paying more in special 
compensation than was necessary to remove the threat of damage to the environment.  This might 
be an instance where the provisions favour salvors more. 
 
The salvor does not have to succeed in saving property, he simply has to be involved in a salvage 
operation where there was a threat of damage to the environment to be entitled to recover his 
expenses.  
 
In terms of Article 14(2), if the salvor manages to prevent or minimize damage to the environment 
as set out in Article 14(1), the special compensation he is entitled to may be increased up to a 
maximum of 30% (uplift) of expenses incurred. 
 
 The tribunal may also increase such special compensation further if it deems it just and equitable 
to do so but not exceeding 100% of the expenses incurred.  This is weighed against the criteria 
                                                          
51 Ibid at 70. 
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listed in Article 13.  It is important to note that the salvor is only entitled to an increase or uplift if 
he actually “prevented or minimized” damage to the environment. The test is on a balance of 
probabilities, that but for his services the damage would have occurred.52 
 
With regards to Article 14(3), expenses reasonably incurred by the salvor in Article 14(1) and 
Article 14(2) means out-of-pocket expenses and a fair rate for equipment and personnel actually 
and reasonably used in a salvage operation. Brice defines out-of-pocket expenses as the expenses 
sustained by a salvor which he would not have suffered if he was not involved in a salvage 
operation.53  Bishop says this is “fairly easily ascertained”.54 However, the salvor is also entitled 
to a fair rate for equipment and personnel actually and reasonably used in addition to out-of-pocket 
expenses and such “fair rate” does not refer to the normal rate.55 Bishop agrees, stating that 
calculating a “fair rate” is a “particularly difficult problem.”56  
 
The assessment of a fair rate for equipment used in Article 14(3) proved to be difficult.  The issue 
of fair rates was dealt with by the House of Lords in the Nagasaki Spirit case57 (to be discussed 
below) where the argument that fair rates include an element of profit failed. However, section 
2(8) of the Wreck and Salvage Act provides: 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of article 14(3) of the Convention, for the purposes of this Act, 
the expression “fair rate” means a rate of remuneration which is fair having regard to the scope of 
the work and to the prevailing market rate, if any, for work of a similar nature.”      
Thus, according to the Wreck and Salvage Act Article 14 includes an element of profit.  The Wreck 
and Salvage Act does not really solve the problem that came with Article 14(3) of the Salvage 
Convention.  It is still left to the Court or arbitrator to decide the “fair rate”, taking into 
consideration the market rate but not solely based on the market rate.  There is also the difficulty 
of determining whether there is a market rate for that service, as this may not be the same as the 
rates charged by an individual salvor.   
                                                          
52 Ibid at 72. 
53 Brice 2ed op cit note 28 at 294, para 4-110. Brice further states that the following are not included as out-of-
pocket expenses: “normal wages, the cost of oil and bunkers and the cost of normal maintenance which the salvor 
would have used in any event.”  
54 Bishop op cit note 3 at 73. 
55 Brice 2ed op cit note 28 at 294-295, para 4-112-113. 
56 Bishop op cit note 3 at 73. 
57 The Nagasaki Spirit, supra note 11. 
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2.4 The Nagasaki Spirit case 
 
The Nagasaki Spirit was involved in a collision with the container ship called Ocean Blessing. 
This accident took place on the 19th of September 1992 at 23h20 in the Malacca Straits. The 
Nagasaki Spirit was loaded with 40,154 tons of crude oil and ended up spilling about 12,000 tons 
of crude oil.  Both the ships caught fire and Ocean Blessing was lost together with all her crew.58  
 
On the 20th of September Semco Salvage Ltd entered into a Lloyd’s Open Form agreement (known 
as the LOF 1990) in which they agreed to salve the Nagasaki Spirit and her cargo.  The LOF 90 
incorporated Article 13 and 14 of the International Salvage Convention, 1989. The salvors 
therefore claimed under Articles 13 and 14 of the Salvage Convention and their claim was referred 
to an arbitration.59   
 
Salvors were then awarded special compensation in terms of Article 14 by an arbitrator and the 
award included an element of profit as part of the ‘fair rate’ for the equipment and personnel used 
in the oil prevention operation.60 However, in the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Staughton held 
that:61: 
“…a fair rate means…a rate of expense, which is to be comprehensive of indirect or overhead 
expenses and take into account the additional cost of having the sources instantly available. 
Remuneration, or uplift, or profit, is to be provided, if at all, under Article 14.2. Beyond that, what 
is a fair rate is a matter of judgement for the tribunals of fact.” 
On Appeal, the House of Lords agreed with the Court of Appeal decision on this point, in that 
Lord Berwick held that:62 
“…Fair rate for equipment and personnel actually and reasonably used in the salvage operation in 
art. 14.3 means a fair rate of expenditure, and does not include any element of profit. This is clear 
from the context, and in particular from the reference to "expenses" in art. 14.1 and 2, and the 
definition of "salvors' expenses" in art. 14.3. No doubt expenses could have been defined so as to 
                                                          
58 The Nagasaki Spirit supra note 11 at 323. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Yearbook 2010. Available at: ttp://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Yearbooks/Yearbook%202010.pdf. 
Accessed on 12 September 2017. 
61 The Nagasaki Spirit supra note 11 at 331. 
62 Ibid at 334. 
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include an element of profit, if very clear language to that effect had been used. But it was not. The 
profit element is confined to the mark-up under art. 14.2, if damage to the environment is minimized 
or prevented.” 
 
Lord Mustill said in his judgement:63 
“I do not accept that salvors need a profit element as a further incentive. Under the former regime 
the undertaking of salvage services was a stark gamble. No cure - no pay. This is no longer so, 
since even if traditional salvage yields little or nothing under Article 13 the salvor will, in the event 
of success in protecting the environment, be awarded a multiple not only of his direct costs but also 
the indirect standby costs, yielding profit. Moreover, even if there is no environmental benefit he 
is assured of an indemnity against his outlays and receives at least some contribution to his standing 
costs. Lack of success no longer means 'no pay' and the provision of this safety net does suffice ... 
to fulfil the purpose of the new scheme.” 
 
The House of Lords further held that if the ‘concept of expenses was intended to include the 
element of profit, this was going to be done using simple and plain language.64 Lord Mustill further 
stated that:65 
“...the promoters of the Convention did not choose, as they might have done, to create an entirely 
new and distinct category of environmental salvage, which would finance the owners of vessels 
and gear to keep them in readiness simply for the purposes of preventing damage to the 
environment. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of article 14 all make it clear that the right to special 
compensation depends on the performance of “salvage operations” which ... are defined by article 
1(a) as operations to assist a vessel in distress. Thus, although article 14 is undoubtedly concerned 
to encourage professional salvors to keep vessels readily available, this is still for the purposes of 
a salvage, for which the primary incentive remains a traditional salvage award.” 
 
The Lord Mustill went on to say that Article 14 (3) deals with the “restricted basis of recovery” as 
opposed to “remuneration”.66  
 
                                                          
63 ibid at 332. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid at 333. 
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The Nagasaki Spirit case has been described as the straw that broke the camel’s back. Firstly, it is 
criticized for not providing for any element of profit in the calculation of a “fair rate”.  At most the 
salvor recovers an additional 100% of expenses as an uplift.  
 
Secondly, it is an expensive and difficult exercise to calculate the fair rate.  Hare submits that with 
regards to fair rate the House of Lords avoided giving a clear indication on how to calculate fair 
rate for equipment used in a salvage operation.  This is left to the court or arbitrators to decide on 
a case by case basis.67  
 
Bishop submits that there are great difficulties in applying measures of assessing expenses in 
Article 14(3).68  The assessment of expenses using Article 14 in the Nagasaki Spirit was referred 
to as “an accounting exercise”,69 but Bishop submits that the problem with this exercise is that it 
was time-consuming and expensive and it led to a lot of uncertainties and dissatisfaction.70 Bishop 
went on to say that a proper assessment of expenses in Article 14(3) was needed which “requires 
an examination of all of the accounts of the salvor, not only in respect to the salvage equipment 
actually used in the salvage operation, but also to all the other equipment available for use, as well 
as administrative costs.”71 
 
Thirdly, Hetherington points out that to be entitled to any uplift on expenses the salvor must prove 
not only that “damage to the environment would have resulted but for the salvor's intervention but 
also the extent of the damage had the operation been unsuccessful”72 (own emphasis).  He further 
submits that different experts such as naval experts, architects, drift experts and environmental 
experts would be needed.73  
 
                                                          
67 Hare Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2ed (2009) at 443. 
68 Bishop op cit note 3 at 75. 
69 The Nagasaki Spirit supra note 11 at 335. 
70 Bishop op cit note 3 at 75. 
71 Ibid at 75. 
72 Hetherington “Report of the International Working Group on the Review of the Salvage Convention” (2012) at 7. 
Available at: 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Salvage%20Convention/2012/Report%20of%20IWG%20on%20Review%
20of%20the%20Salvage%20Convention%20for%20consideration%20by%20delegates.pdf. Accessed 12 September 
2017. 
73 Ibid. 
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Article 14(4) states that such special compensation will only be paid if it is greater that any reward 
in Article 13. 
 
2.5     The Special Compensation P&I Club Clause (SCOPIC) 
 
The Special Compensation P&I Club Clause (SCOPIC) provides as follows: 
 
“2. Invoking the SCOPIC Clause  
The Contractor shall have the option to invoke by written notice to the owners of the vessel 
the SCOPIC clause set out hereafter at any time of his choosing regardless of the 
circumstances and, in particular, regardless of whether or not there is a “threat of damage 
to the environment”. The assessment of SCOPIC remuneration shall commence from the 
time the written notice is given to the owners of the vessel and services rendered before the 
said written notice shall not be remunerated under this SCOPIC clause at all but in 
accordance with Convention Article 13 as incorporated into the Main Agreement (“Article 
13”). 
… 
5. (i)  SCOPIC remuneration shall mean the total of the tariff rates of personnel; tugs and other 
craft; portable salvage equipment; out of pocket expenses; and bonus due.  
 
(ii)  SCOPIC remuneration in respect of all personnel… shall be assessed on a time and 
materials basis in accordance with the Tariff set out in Appendix “A”. This tariff will apply 
until reviewed and amended by the SCOPIC Committee in accordance with Appendix 
B(1)(b). The tariff rates which will be used to calculate SCOPIC remuneration are those 
in force at the time the salvage services take place. 
 … 
(iv)  In addition to the rates set out above and any out of pocket expenses, the Contractor shall 
be entitled to a standard bonus of 25% of those rates …  
 
6. Article 13 Award  
(i) The salvage services under the Main Agreement shall continue to be assessed in 
accordance with Article 13, even if the Contractor has invoked the SCOPIC clause. 
SCOPIC remuneration as assessed under sub-clause 5 above will be payable only by the 
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owners of the vessel and only to the extent that it exceeds the total Article 13 Award (or, if 
none, any potential Article 13 Award) payable by all salved interests (including cargo, 
bunkers, lubricating oil and stores) before currency adjustment and before interest and 
costs even if the Article 13 Award or any part of it is not recovered.  
… 
7. Discount 
 If the SCOPIC clause is invoked under sub-clause 2 hereof and the Article 13 Award or 
settlement (before currency adjustment and before interest and costs) under the Main 
Agreement is greater than the assessed SCOPIC remuneration then, notwithstanding the 
actual date on which the SCOPIC remuneration provisions were invoked, the said Article 
13 Award or settlement shall be discounted by 25% of the difference between the said 
Article 13 Award or settlement and the amount of SCOPIC remuneration that would have 
been assessed had the SCOPIC remuneration provisions been invoked on the first day of 
the services.” 
 
SCOPIC is a clause which can be incorporated into the LOF.   When SCOPIC is incorporated by 
the parties into the LOF contract it replaces Article 14.   In order to rely on SCOPIC the salvor 
must invoke SCOPIC by giving a notice under sub-clause 2.  He may do this at any time, even if 
there is no threat of damage to the environment. 
 
SCOPIC was introduced due to the dissatisfaction arising from the House of Lord’s decision in 
the Nagasaki Spirit case regarding Article 14(3) “fair rate”.74 As the result of this the International 
Salvage Union (ISU) launched Salvage 2000, which had the support of the P & I Clubs, to 
substitute “predetermined market rates of remuneration for Article 14 compensation.”75  P & I 
Clubs then introduced the SCOPIC clause, which could be incorporated under the LOF 2000.  
SCOPIC was revised in 2005, 2007, 2011, and 2014.76  The latest amendment is a 2017 amendment 
of rates in Appendix A.77  SCOPIC was designed to encourage salvors to come to the assistance 
                                                          
74 Hare op cit note 67 at 444. 
75 Ibid at 444. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Available at https://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/the-market/tools-and-resources/agency/salvage-arbitration-
branch/scopic_appendix_a_2017.pdf?la=en., accessed on 12 September 2017. 
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of a ship which threatens damage to the environment just like Article 14 but with less 
complications.78 
 
Therefore, clause 5 states that SCOPIC remuneration is made up of tariff rates of personnel, tugs 
and other craft, portable salvage equipment; out-of-pocket expenses and in addition the salvor gets 
a bonus of 25%.  It is important to note that while in the Nagasaki Spirit the House of Lords held 
that ‘fair rate’ in terms of Article 14.3 did not include an element of profit, the tariff rates for 
personnel, tugs and portable salvage equipment set in in Appendix A are based on market rates 
and thus do include a profit element.79 
 
SCOPIC is paid by the ship owner alone “to the extent that it exceeds” any Article 13 award that 
may be payable.80  
 
If SCOPIC is invoked and it happens that the Article 13 award is greater than SCOPIC 
remuneration, then the Article 13 reward will be discounted by 25% of the difference between the 
Article 13 reward and SCOPIC remuneration.81   
 
Once SCOPIC has been invoked the ship owner may appoint a Special Casualty Representative 
(SCR) as set out in Appendix B,82 which enables shipowners to remain informed of how the 
salvage operation is progressing. 
 
Igwe points out that SCOPIC was drafted by the maritime community for the benefit of the 
maritime community. He states that SCOPIC is a game of give and take which gives shipowners 
more control over the salvage operation and gives salvors a fair reward and better security. 
Therefore, the SCOPIC clause will benefit all the parties concerned.83  Igwe further points out that 
                                                          
78 Bishop op cit note 3 at 77-78. 
79 SCOPIC 2014, Clause 5 (ii). 
80 SCOPIC 2014, Clause 6 (i). 
81 SCOPIC 2014, Clause 7. 
82 SCOPIC 2014, Clause 12. 
83 Igwe “Transportation of Oil and Gas by Sea: Maritime Salvage, SCOPIC and the Vexed ISSUE of Environmental 
Salvage Regime” Scholars Journal of Economics, Business and Management, (2015) 2 (6A) at 618. See also: Daines 
“The Lloyds Open Form and Special Compensation P&I Clause (SCOPIC)”. Available 
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with SCOPIC salvors do not have to prove a threat of damage to the environment, and thus 
SCOPIC changed the situation for the better.84 Khosla submits that SCOPIC did away with the 
difficulties that came with Article 14 of the 1989 Salvage Convention due the House of Lords 
decision in the Nagasaki Spirit case85, in that SCOPIC rewards salvors even in cases which might 
not be financially attractive.86 
 
Although SCOPIC makes it easier to calculate the special remuneration payable to the salvor, 
SCOPIC does not take into consideration the effort of the salvors in preventing or minimizing 
damage to the environment or make any provision for him to earn a higher bonus on account of 
these efforts.  It is limited to a standard bonus of 25%.  
 
2.6   Conclusion 
 
Salvage is indeed an ancient right, which for a very long time was concerned with the saving of 
property and required salvors to be successful in saving property for them to receive an award.  
This was in terms of the rule of “no cure-no pay”. In the early 1960’s and 1970’s the disasters such 
as the Torrey Canyon in 1967 and the Atlantic Empress in 1979 awakened an environmental 
consciousness in many States.87  
 
The 1989 Salvage Convention saw the need to protect the environment and introduced two 
changes: Article 13(1)(b) and Article 14. Article 13(1)(b) looks at the skill and efforts of the salvor 
in preventing and minimizing damage to the environment as a factor in determining a salvage 
award; and Article 14 which is regarded as a safety net affords salvors special compensation for 
their efforts in preventing or minimizing damage to the environment even where no property is 
saved if they failed to earn an equivalent reward under Article 13. With regards to Article 14, the 
House of Lords in the Nagasaki Spirit 88 held that “fair rate” or expenses used in terms of Article 
                                                          
at:  http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Salvage%20Convention/Graham%20Daines%20-
%20Scopic%20Paper.pdf.  Accessed on 12 September 2017 
84 Ibid. 
85 The Nagasaki Spirit supra note 11. 
86 Khosla op cit note 23 at 5. 
87 Storgards op cit note 32 at 9. 
88 The Nagasaki Spirit supra note 11. 
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14.3 did not include an element of profit.  However, in South Africa the Wreck and Salvage Act 
provides that “fair rates” includes an element of profit considering the work done and the market 
rates.  Due to the difficulties because of the House of Lords decision in the Nagasaki Spirit case, 
Article 14 was replaced by SCOPIC in LOF contracts that incorporate the SCOPIC clause.  
 
But in 2012 ISU proposed that the 1989 Salvage Convention be revised to allow for an 
environmental salvage award (to be discussed in Chapter three below) because SCOPIC does not 
properly reward salvors for their effort preventing damage to the environment.89  The ISU proposal 
is discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
89 International Salvage Union position Paper (ISU’s position paper) op cit note 17 at 1.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE INTERNATIONAL SALVAGE UNION’S PROPOSAL FOR AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL SALVAGE AWARD 
3.1.  Introduction 
Environmental concerns have shaped the law of salvage, in that in today’s world taking care of the 
environment is being recognized as equally important, arguably even more important, than salving 
personal property.  As discussed in chapter two, the movement towards an environmental 
conscious began in the 1960’s and 1970’s due to the development of oil tankers and the increase 
of marine casualties which led to pollution problems. Disasters such as the Torrey Canyon, 
Atlantic Empress and Amoco Cadiz awakened an environmental awareness in different States. The 
International Salvage Union (ISU) expressed this view in 2016; that while traditional salvage’s 
main objective was to save property, recently society has become more environmentally conscious 
and now protecting the marine environment comes before saving property. 90  
The Rena in 201191, the Costa Concordia in 201292, and the Chennai oil spill in 201793 are recent 
examples of salvage operations where environmental concerns were important. ISU believes that 
it is time to amend the 1989 Salvage Convention and create a separate environmental salvage 
award. ISU believes the present systems under the 1989 Salvage Convention and where applicable 
the Special Compensation P & I Club Clause (SCOPIC) do not properly recognize the salvor’s 
efforts in protecting the environment.94   In 2007 ISU put forward its proposal for an environmental 
salvage award and this was followed in 2012 by ISU’s position paper on the 1989 Salvage 
Convention. 
ISU’s proposal was greatly opposed by shipowners and P & I Clubs.  Their argument was that they 
were happy with SCOPIC and that an environmental salvage award cannot be quantified therefore 
                                                          
90 Wahi, “Oil Spill in India 2016” a paper presented at the Oil Spill India 4th International Conference & Exhibition 
conference at JW Marroitt, Sahar, Mumbai, India (ISU’s conference paper) op cit note 20. 
91 Rene, New Zealand, 2011. Available at: http://www.itopf.com/in-action/case-studies/case-study/rena-new-
zealand-2011/. Accessed on 8 October 2017.  This case involved containers with dangerous cargo and the spillage 
of fuel oil. 
92 Costa Concordia, 2012. Available at: https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn21388-will-the-costa-concordia-
become-an-oil-spill-disaster/. Accessed on 8 October 2017.  This casualty involved fuel oil and toxic compounds 
spilled near the Italian coastline. 
93 India oil spill 2017. Available at: http://www.icmam.gov.in/ospilMar2017.pdf. Accessed on 8 October 2017. This 
casualty involved a spillage of fuel oil. 
94 ISU’s Position Paper op cit note 17 at 1.  
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making it difficult to calculate. ISU’s proposal would have made shipowners, and their P&I Clubs, 
liable for the payment of this new environmental salvage award.  The objection raised was that all 
parties to the marine voyage, thus including cargo owners, should be liable.95 
Cargo interest’s argument was that they cannot be expected to contribute to something they did 
not benefit from but they were in support of ISU’s proposal and they even suggested that the only 
possible solution to the assessment of such an award is if it is based on a tariff system similar to 
SCOPIC.96  
This chapter will discuss the reasons given by ISU for proposing an environmental salvage award, 
before discussing the proposed amendments to the 1989 Salvage Convention and the issues 
regarding the assessment of such an award. 
 
3.2   ISU’s Proposal for an Environmental Salvage Award 
ISU on behalf of salvors proposed that the 1989 Salvage Convention must be amended to create a 
separate environmental salvage award taking into consideration the degree of success obtained by 
a salvor in preventing damage to the environment. ISU believes that it is time for an environmental 
award to be created that will reward salvors for their efforts in protecting the environment.97 ISU 
believes the present system under the 1989 Salvage Convention and where applicable SCOPIC 
does not properly recognize salvor’s efforts in preventing or minimizing damage to the 
environment.98  
Bishop states that ISU’s attempt to push this agenda was first discussed with the Lloyd’s Form 
Salvage Group, which is responsible for keeping the LOF up to date and in line with the needs of 
the maritime industry. This fell short because the Subcommittee99 which was set up by the Lloyd’s 
                                                          
95 Khosla op cit note 23.  
96 Gooding “Environmental Salvage: The Property Underwriter’s view” at 3. Available at: 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/uploads/salvage%20convention/paper_4_nicholas_gooding.pdf. Accessed on 
the 8 October 2017. 
97 ISU’s position paper op cit note 17 at 1. 
98 Ibid. 
99 The Subcommittee was made up of representatives from the property underwriters, the P & I Groups, the ISC 
and ISU.  
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Form Salvage Group did not agree on the matter.100 ISU then approached the Committee Maritime 
International (CMI) and asked them to review the 1989 Salvage Convention. CMI accepted the 
matter and proceeded to set up an International Working Group (IWG) to work on ISU’s 
proposal.101  
The IWG first raised the matter of the ISU proposal in a meeting which was held in London in 
May 2010, and again in October 2010 ISU’s proposal was discussed at a CMI colloquium which 
was held in Buenos Aires.102 Then in October 2012 the IWG prepared a full report for a conference 
which was held in Beijing.103  
ISU believes that environmental concerns are dominant in every salvage case. Todd Busch, the 
ex-president of the ISU at the CMI colloquium in Buenos Aires, expressed this view when 
explaining why the salvage industry felt it was not being properly rewarded for it efforts in 
preventing damage to the environment.104 Busch went on to say firstly ISU acknowledges that in 
many cases salvors are rewarded for protecting the environment under article 13 (1) (b), but 
because of the low value of the salved property the tribunal cannot give full effect to this provision. 
He further explained that most cases that threaten damage to the environment are often of low 
value compared to the cost and effort involved in preventing or minimizing damage to the 
environment and it is in these cases that salvors feel inadequately rewarded.105  
Busch further explained that although Article 14 in such cases rewards salvors for their efforts in 
preventing or minimizing damage to the environment even where no property was saved, the 
problem is that Article 14 is “a safety net” and not “a method of remuneration” and the same can 
be said with SCOPIC.106   He later refers to the “safety net” as a recovery of the “bare minimum”, 
in other words a recovery only of the costs spent on the operation with no profit. 
Moreover, salvors receive this bare minimum in 25% of all LOF cases where SCOPIC is 
applicable. He went on to say that: 
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“We recognize that the introduction of the SCOPIC Clause substantially improved the mechanism 
of assessing ‘special compensation’, as compared to the 1989 Salvage Convention’s Article 14, in 
LOF cases. But I emphasize, SCOPIC, like Article 14 is a method of compensation when an award 
to cover cost cannot be made. It is not a method of remuneration which is what we seek. Salvors 
would not be in the salvage business if their remuneration was restricted to an Article 14 or SCOPIC 
award.”107  
 
Busch gave three reasons for ISU’s environmental salvage award proposal: 
 
 “Firstly, much has changed since the Salvage Convention was first drafted in 1981. Environmental 
issues now dominate every salvage case and what may have been a satisfactory “encouragement” 
then is no longer so today. Further, there is more risk to the salvor from tougher regimes which can 
criminalize the actions of well-meaning salvors. 
Secondly, while salvors always work to protect the environment whilst carrying out salvage 
operations, they are not fully rewarded for the benefit they confer. They are rewarded for saving 
the ship and cargo, but not the environment. 
Thirdly, salvors and marine property insurers believe it is not fair that the traditional salvage reward 
that currently, but inadequately, reflects the salvors’ efforts in protecting the environment is wholly 
paid by the ship and cargo owners and their insurers without any contribution from the liability 
insurers, who cover the shipowners’ exposure to claims for pollution and environmental damage.” 
ISU believes that environmental concerns are dominant in every salvage operation. This statement 
needs to be examined critically to see if ISU is justified in their first reason for change, however it 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation to undertake such a comprehensive survey.  
If the ISU’s contention is correct, that environmental concerns now dominate each salvage 
operation then it appears that the International Salvage Convention, or SCOPIC where it is 
applicable, are no longer adequate.  This is because in both Article 14 of the Convention and 
SCOPIC the main objective is to save property. Although they do recognise the need to protect the 
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environment the problem with Article 14 is that fair rates do not include profit and SCOPIC is 
limited to a standard bonus of 25% irrespective of the result achieved by a salvor. 
ISU states that there has been a change in practical salvage in the last 30 years not only because 
the environment is central in each salvage operation, but also because there is now “enormous 
regulatory control” making the salvor’s task very difficult when they are subject to powers 
exercised by “inexperienced local officials”.108 However, Hume submits that the only thing that 
has changed since 1989 is the scale and volume in which the public responds to environmental 
casualties, but that when it comes to casualty response nothing has changed whether substantially 
or practically.109 ISU further points out that in recent decades priorities have changed in such a 
way that society has become more environmentally conscious in that protecting the marine 
environment comes before saving property.110 The cost of cleaning up an oil spill can amount to 
billions and this means that salvors need to invest in better equipment designed to help salvors 
protect the environment. 
ISU’s second reason for change is that they feel that the present systems do not properly reward 
them for protecting the environment but they are rewarded for saving property. They argue that 
any reward under Article 13 is limited to the size of the salved fund weighed against the market 
value of the ship and cargo at the termination of the salvage service.111  Where SCOPIC is 
applicable ISU acknowledges that SCOPIC operates well but the problem is that SCOPIC is based 
upon tariff rates and that it is not a reward system but merely compensation. It does not take into 
consideration the degree of success achieved by the salvor in preventing or minimizing damage to 
the environment.112 
ISU points out that it has data collected starting from 1978 dealing with nearly 2900 Lloyds Form 
cases and the data shows that the annual salvage revenue equates to an average of 8.12% of salved 
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values (Awards and negotiated settlements). The highest revenue from Awards and settlements 
was in the year 2000 which amounted to an average of 12.5% of salved values.113 ISU therefore 
submitted that compared to the value at risk starting from 1978 to 2008 which under the Lloyd’s 
Form have amounted US$ 24.5 billion, “the revenue is comparatively modest”.114  
 ISU conducted a further exercise of its annual pollution prevention survey since 1994. From 1994 
to 2015 ISU members have salvaged 22 million tons of potential pollutants with an average of 
more than one million tons per year.115 ISU states that in 2016 alone they provided 213 services to 
vessels carrying over 2.5 million tons of potential pollution.116  ISU is aware that “not every vessel 
was a casualty which would have given rise to actual environmental damage”.117  President of the 
ISU, John Witte, said:118 
“Members of the ISU are often the only agency available with the necessary resources and 
experience to intervene in a casualty situation. And there is no doubt that, yet again, in 2016 our 
members’ services have helped to protect the marine environment from potential damage. 
Improvements in shipping -vessel quality as well as crew training, improved aids to navigation and 
so on -have reduced the number of casualties but we are all aware that it only needs one major 
incident to cause an environmental disaster.” 
It is important to note that starting from 1994 up to 2016 members of ISU managed to salve 
24 800 899 tons of potential pollution.119 This shows there is an increase in the work done by 
salvors every year to prevent damage to the environment.   This shows the ever-growing 
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environmental concerns and that salvors are not paid for what they achieve in protecting the 
environment.  
ISU is therefore correct that the current systems do not take into consideration the degree of success 
obtained by the salvor in minimizing or preventing damage to the environment, even though they 
do ensure that a salvor is paid Article 14 does not include profit and SCOPIC is limited to a bonus 
of 25%. An environmental salvage award will ensure that salvors are rewarded for their efforts 
and this also will encourage them to stay in business and find better ways to ensure that the 
environment is protected. Bishop submits that there are only about five international salvage 
companies operating worldwide that can deal with cases that “substantially” threaten damage to 
the environment.120  
3.3   ISU’s Proposed Amendments to the 1989 Salvage Convention 
To be able to achieve an environmental salvage award ISU suggests that Articles 1(d), 13 and 14 
be amended as follows: 
3.3.1   Revised Article 1(d) 
Revised Article 1(d) reads as follows: 
“d) ‘Damage to the environment’ means significant substantial physical damage to human health 
or to marine life or resources in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto, caused by 
pollution, contamination, fire, explosion or similar major incidents.”   
In defining “damage to the environment” firstly, ISU proposed that “significant” must replace 
“substantial” because they consider “significant” to be a more realistic measure when it comes to 
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environmental concerns. The coastal states may consider even casualties with a few tons of oil as 
a significant threat to the environment.121  
Secondly, ISU proposed that the geographical restrictions “in coastal or inland waters or areas 
adjacent thereto” be removed from the current definition, because when it comes to the 
environment there is no need for geographical limits.122 ISU’s proposal to remove the geographical 
limits is more in line with how “damage to the environment” is defined in section 2 (7) of the 
Wreck and Salvage Act123 in South Africa which states that “damage to the environment is not 
restricted to in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto.” 
Lastly, ISU is of the view that “any informed tribunal would be quite capable of making up its 
mind as to the risk of ‘significant’ damage to the environment in the light of all the 
circumstances and in the interest of simplicity sees no purpose in imposing any geographical 
limit.”124 Alternatively, ISU further stated that the Exclusive Economic Zone would be more 
appropriate as a new limit because Conventions such as the Civil Liability Convention of 1992125  
(CLC), the International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection 
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea of 2010 (HNS) and the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage of 2001 
(BUNKER) already use the Exclusive Economic Zone.126 
 
3.3.2   Revised Article 13.1 
ISU’s proposal involves very little change to the current Article 13. ISU has proposed that Article 
13 (1) (b) must be deleted and be incorporated into the revised article 14.127 Article 13 (1) (b) of 
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the Salvage Convention currently reads as follows: “(b) the skill and efforts of the salvors in 
preventing or minimizing damage to the environment.” 
A new sub-article 13 (4) provides that the skill and efforts of the salvor in preventing or minimising 
damage to the environment will not be taken into consideration when calculating an award under 
the revised Article 13 (1).128  
3.3.3   Revised Article 14  
ISU suggested that Article 14 needed to be amended the most. Article 14 was dealt with greatly in 
many LOF arbitrations between 1990 and 1999 and the House of Lords fully examined Article 14 
in the Nagasaki Spirit129. As discussed in chapter 2, article 14 was found to be uncertain, expensive 
and cumbersome to operate. Due to the difficulties Article 14 was replaced in the LOF by SCOPIC 
but Article 14 is still applicable in 59 countries. ISU’s proposal is that Article 14 must be struck 
out entirely and be replaced with the following:130 
“14.1.  If the salvor has carried out salvage operations in respect of a vessel which by itself, or 
its bunkers or its cargo, threatened damage to the environment he shall also be entitled to 
an environmental award, in addition to the reward to which he may be entitled under Article 
13. The environmental award shall be fixed with a view to encouraging the prevention and 
minimisation of damage to the environment whilst carrying out salvage operations, taking into 
account the following criteria without regard to the order in which they are presented below: 
(a) any reward made under the revised Article 13; 
(b) the criteria set out in the revised Article 13.1(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) and (i); and 
(c) the extent to which the salvor has prevented or minimised damage to the environment and 
the resultant benefit conferred.” 
 
In terms of the revised Article 14 (1) if the salvor has carried out a salvage operation in respect of 
a ship which threatened damage to the environment, the salvor shall be entitled to an environmental 
award which is to be paid in addition to a reward which the salvor is entitled to receive under 
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Article 13. ISU is of the view that this award is fixed to encourage salvors to prevent and minimize 
damage to the environment. 
ISU submits that an environmental award will be made by a tribunal whenever there is a threat of 
damage to the environment.  It is not necessary to prove, as currently required by Article 13, that 
damage was prevented or minimised.  All the salvor must do under the revised Article 14 is to be 
involved in a salvage operation that threatens damage to the environment.  This is the same as the 
position under the current Article 14 (1).   The amount of the award under the revised Article is 
left completely to the discretion of the tribunal. This is weighed against the criteria listed in the 
revised Article 14 (1).131 
ISU further submits that the criteria listed in (a) and (b) mirror Article 13 and they give the tribunal 
the power to take into consideration the degree of success obtained by the salvor in preventing and 
minimizing damage to the environment and thereby award salvors the benefits they are entitled 
to.132 So, if there was a threat of pollution found in the water, this means that the benefits conferred 
to salvors will be much greater as opposed to a situation where no pollution was found.  
ISU proposed that such an award will be paid by the shipowner and his liability insurers.133  
The current Article 14 special compensation is also paid by the shipowner. The difference is that 
an environmental award is not limited to expenses whereas the current Article 14 (1) is limited to 
expenses. Furthermore, an environmental award is paid in addition to the reward under Article 13, 
whereas with the current Article 14 (1) a salvor is entitled to special compensation only if he failed 
to earn a reward under Article 13 equivalent to the special compensation.   
This is in fact quite a dramatic change when one considers that salvors will also receive an 
environmental award even in cases where salvors did not successfully prevent damage to the 
environment (in cases of no success) just by being involved in a case that threatens damage to the 
                                                          
131 ISU’s Position Paper op cit note 17 at 6. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
34 
 
environment, which will be paid in addition to the Article 13 reward.   In the situation where the 
salvor successfully prevents or minimizes damage to the environment they will receive even more 
benefits as the degree of success obtained by the salvor is weighed together with the criteria listed 
in the revised Article 14 (1) (a-c). 
ISU proposed that there must be a cap or limitation to an environmental award. ISU proposed the 
following: 
“14.2  Any reward payable by the Shipowner in respect of services to the environment, 
exclusive of any interest and recoverable legal costs that may be payable thereon, 
shall not exceed an amount equivalent to;  
a)  In respect of a vessel of 20,000 Gross Tons or less, ‘x’ Special Drawing Rights.  
b)  For a vessel exceeding 20,000 Gross Tons, ‘x’ Special Drawing Rights, plus ‘y’ Special 
Drawing Rights for each ton in excess of 20,000, subject always to a maximum of ‘z’ 
Special Drawing Rights.” 
ISU suggested that there must be a limitation to such an award which looks “looks to the Gross 
Tonnage of the casualty with a multiplier of Special Drawing Rights.”134 ISU further proposed the 
following: 
“14.3.   For the avoidance of doubt, an environmental award shall be paid in addition to any   
liability the shipowner may have for damage caused to other parties.” 
ISU regards Article 14 (3) as important because it believes salvors must always receive their full 
environmental salvage reward and not be put in a position where that reward is reduced or lost 
because salvors are “competing with third party claimants”, which would also cause delays while 
the competing rights are being determined.135 
“14.4  Any environmental award shall be paid by the shipowners.” 
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ISU suggests that such an award must be paid by shipowners alone because shipowners are liable 
for “any pollution under modern Conventions and Laws”.136 Khosla disagrees with this and 
submits that there is a shared responsibility by shipowners, cargo interests, government and the 
public for the environment and its protection.137 She further submits that this is done through the 
Civil Liability Convention of 1992138 (CLC), the Fund Convention of 1992139 and the 
International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the 
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS) of 2010.140 CLC provides that the 
owner is liable for environmental damage and that in the event where the owner is unable to pay 
the CLC claim or the claim exceeds CLC limits the Fund provides the additional payment.141 
Khosla further submits that Fund payments are paid or contributed by the cargo interests.142 
It is submitted that Khosla’s position is possibly more workable.  Any environmental salvage 
award must be paid by everyone who benefited from it, and thus the award must be distributed 
fairly amongst shipowners and their liability insurers, cargo owners and cargo insurers.  Since 
Conventions hold shipowners liable for pollution, they will liable for such an award with their 
liability insurers provided that it does not exceed the agreed amount. In cases where the claim 
exceeds the agreed amount, then the additional payments will be paid by the cargo interests.  
 
The difficulty is that imposing any liability has been strenuously opposed by cargo underwriters.  
Bishop provides that insurers will only cover what they insure.143  Gooding on behalf of property 
underwriters argued that hull and cargo underwriters insure loss and damage to property; they do 
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not cover liabilities. It is not fair that the hull and cargo underwriters are expected to pay for 
measures to prevent pollution and other liabilities.144  
 
However, it seems that a solution has to be found because the types of cargos being carried on 
ships can pose a significant threat of damage to the environment. Sloane points out that oil is no 
longer the only pollutant.  There are many pollutants listed in the International Maritime 
Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG), cargoes classified as hazardous and noxious substances, which 
can make the risk of environmental damage from oil seem “benign”.145  
 
Lastly, ISU proposed that if the salvor has been negligent and thereby fails the prevent damage, 
he will be deprived of any environmental award due to him in terms of Article 14 (5); and Article 
14 (6) provides that nothing in this article shall affect the owner’s right of recourse. 
 
3.4    Assessment of an Environmental Salvage Award    
 
ISU submits that over the last 100 years, experience has shown that a competent and informed 
Tribunal is capable of weighing up relevant factors to make a fair and just award, and therefore an 
environmental salvage award will be left entirely to the discretion of a Tribunal.146 The LOF 
system is a tried and tested system which on a yearly basis, deals with a lot of cases- “some of 
enormous proportions.” ISU further points out that there is no reason why a Tribunal cannot do 
the same when it comes the assessment of an environmental award, the only difference is that they 
will consider the danger of damage to the environment instead of the damage or loss to the ship 
and cargo.147 
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On the other hand, those opposing such change say that such an award will be difficult to calculate 
and based on too many uncertainies because it cannot be quantified.148 Beale submits that the 
difficulty involved in calculating an environmental award makes ISU’s proposal unacceptable.149  
 
While Article 14, SCOPIC and the revised Article 14 are all paid by shipowner, the difference is 
that SCOPIC and the current Article 14’s main objective is to save property whereas the proposed 
Article 14’s main objective is to save the environment. The problem with the current Article 14 is 
that fair rates do not include profit and SCOPIC is limited to a standard bonus irrespective of the 
work done. Both Article 14 and SCOPIC are merely compensation and not a reward system.  Even 
though SCOPIC works well, it is based upon a tariff. SCOPIC is invoked by a written notice but 
it is not clear when the current Article 14 is triggered. The revised Article 14 is triggered by a 
threat of damage to the environment and such an award is paid in addition to Article 13 and it 
looks at the degree of success obtained by a salvor in preventing or minimizing damage to the 
environment. This will ensure that salvors are paid for what they achieved but the biggest problem 
such an award is that it is difficult to assess because it cannot be quantified. However, this does 
not mean it cannot be done.   
 
Hurst provides that the assessment of any environmental award would be speculative, subjective, 
hypothetical and inconsistent with the current awards. He further points out that unlike SCOPIC 
an environmental salvage award would delay payments to salvors because of the uncertainties 
involved.150 Khosla holds the same view as Hurst concerning ISU’s proposal for an environmental 
award and she submitted an environmental award would:151 
 
 
“alter the basis of salvage operations. The prime objection would be no longer to save property. 
The basis of the award would be the amount of pollution that salvors prevented. This in itself would 
be based on a hypothetical assessment of the damage that has been prevented. It hardly needs saying 
that this would entail a difficult and speculative enquiry into what damage might have occurred had 
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pollution resulted from the casualty. There is moreover no guidance on what an appropriate award 
amount would be in any given incident. ...This would raise the bar significantly and the increased 
sums at stake would inevitably result in contentious expert evidence and speculative theorising. 
This would no doubt result in more litigation and serve no-one's interests.” 
 
She further submits that SCOPIC guarantees that salvors will be paid, in that SCOPIC provides 
salvors with “profitable and reasonable rewards” for their efforts in protecting the environment 
and that SCOPIC rates have been increased significantly and they continue to do so.152  
 
Beale provides that the uncertainties of an environmental award makes it distasteful and difficult 
to calculate.153 De la Rue submits that there has not been a significant change since the first oil 
incident when it comes to the assessment of the environmental impact because of the difficulties 
involved.154 Beale submits that it is common that an oil spill can have a serious impact on the 
marine environment and life and he gave the example of dead sea birds soaked in oil155, but 
assessment of an environmental award has proved to be difficult because of the “highly complex 
science” involved in the marine environment.156 
 
The extent and period of environmental damage caused by an oil spill is difficult to establish 
therefore making such an award difficult to calculate. To understand the importance and damage 
caused by an oil spill, you need to understand whether the oil spill affects results in breeding 
success, productivity, diversity and the overall function of the system which is a difficult 
process.157  
 
De la Rue submits that for nearly two decades the assessment of claims for oil pollution from 
tankers have been done by the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund). In 
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practice under the IOPC Fund, the assessment of most claims depends on the facts and evidence 
of the actual loss suffered. The Fund takes time for an analysis to be made of the extent of damage 
and the data to be collected.158 The Fund looks at the actual loss suffered whereas an environmental 
salvage award will be based on the “unknown unknowns” which will be resolved by staring into a 
“hazy crystal ball of hypotheticals”.159 The degree of speculation involved in the assessment of 
such an award will result in lengthy and expensive legal actions which is not in the public interest 
nor the interest of the shipping industry.160 
 
Therefore, the majority of writers have disagreed with the ISU view that a Tribunal could handle 
the assessment of an environmental award.161  Howard QC, however, agrees with ISU that such 
an award can be achieved by competent arbitrators. He went on to say that even though an 
environmental award will be based on the “unknown unknowns” this does not mean that such 
awards cannot be achieved.162  
 
Moreover, Howard further points out that the solution is a practical one:  
“An arbitrator would approach the matter much as he does in a normal salvage case. He  
would take into account many of the same factors as envisaged by the new Article 14; and if he 
lacks a value against which to measure his overall award, he is likely to have extensive evidence 
of potential cost and risk.”163 
 
Gooding on behalf of marine property underwriters provided a possible alternative solution on 
how an environmental salvage award can be calculated. He suggests that for such an award to be 
possible it must be based upon the SCOPIC tariff system and controlled by the Special Casualty 
Representative (SCR).164 
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In order to calculate such an award a tariff system similar to SCOPIC must be created costing all 
steps which are aimed at preventing environmental liabilities. Where there is a salvage operation 
a Representative must be appointed to apportion each step as either saving the property or 
minimizing environmental liabilities. It is suggested that steps directly or indirectly taken to 
prevent or minimize environmental liabilities should be taken into consideration when calculating 
an environmental salvage award.165  
 
Moreover, measures considered to have been taken to save the property must continue to be 
rewarded under the existing Article 13 or SCOPIC. Where measures are taken to prevent or 
minimize damage to the environment, such steps should be the subject of an environmental award 
alone. However, where steps are taken to save both the property and the environment the award 
should be apportioned between the ship and the cargo.166 The SCR will be able to calculate the 
cost of such an award and an arbitrator has the power to uplift the environmental liability reward 
by a factor calculated with reference to the degree of risk that the liability would be crystallized 
and the extent of potential liabilities avoided. The uplift will be limited to a minimum of 25% and 
maximum of 100% subject to the overall limit.167  
 
Salvors must be encouraged to take environmental cases and they must be accordingly rewarded 
for what they achieve in protecting the environment. Therefore, Gooding’s suggestion that such 
an award must be based on a tariff system similar to SCOPIC is arguably the best solution to the 
difficulties of calculating such an award. Beale points out that for such an award to work, the 
property underwriter’s suggestion on how to calculate an environmental award will provide the 
most fair, impartial, and explicit way in assessing the rewards.168  
 
Bishop provides that such an award will benefit everyone in that an environmental salvage award 
will be distributed fairly amongst those liable to pay for them. He further states that there will be 
security in the shipping industry and in the public because salvors will be properly rewarded for 
                                                          
165 ibid at 6. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid at 6-7. 
168 Beale op cit note 149 at 260. 
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their achievement in protecting the environment.  This will encourage salvors to invest in the future 
and better equipment which will help them remain in business. The proposed change is not 
intended to amount in huge rewards.169 
 
Sloane submits that after saving life, the environment has become the biggest factor in salvage, 
and that ISU’s proposal will benefit the public by keeping the people “on the beach as opposed to 
the beach being covered in oil”.170   
 
3.5   Conclusion   
 
Environmental concerns have shaped the law of salvage. ISU has proposed that the current systems 
under the 1989 Salvage Convention and, where applicable, SCOPIC, must be amended to create a 
separate environmental award, because they do not properly reward salvors for their efforts in 
preventing damage to the environment.171  
 
ISU argues that environmental concerns are dominant in every salvage operation and they argue 
that the current system’s main objective is to save property, and does not adequately compensate 
the salvor for the degree of success achieved by a salvor in minimizing or preventing damage to 
the environment.172 Where SCOPIC is applicable it was argued that SCOPIC is based upon tariff 
rates and it is not a reward system.173   
 
ISU’s proposal was not received well by the shipping industry, in that shipowners and their liability 
insurers argued that an environmental award is based on too many uncertainties because it cannot 
be quantified thereby making it difficult to calculate.174 They were happy with SCOPIC arguing 
that it does properly reward salvors. 
 
                                                          
169 Bishop op cit note 3 at 98. 
170 Sloane op cit note 145 at 514. 
171 ISU’s Position Paper op cit note 17 at 1. 
172 Busch op cit note 19 at 4. 
173 ISU’s Position Paper op cit note 17 at 3. 
174 Khosla op cit note 23 at 7.  
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ISU believes that an environmental award can be achieved by a competent Tribunal with the 
required skill and knowledge, arguing that experience over the years of adjudicating salvage 
awards has shown this. Marine property underwriters support ISU’s proposal in part, but do not 
agree that cargo underwriters can be held liable to pay this award, and suggest that an 
environmental award can only be achieved if it is based upon a tariff system similar to SCOPIC 
which will be controlled by a Special Casualty Representative.175  
 
An environmental award will ensure that salvors are paid for what they really achieved in 
protecting the environment. This will help them invest in the future and in better equipment and 
help them stay in business.  
 
It is submitted that the shipping industry must be careful to ensure that resistance to change is 
based on sound reasons and not simply because the industry has become too comfortable with how 
the current system works. While it is noted that SCOPIC works well and SCOPIC continues to 
increase it tariff rates as they recently revised their rates in the SCOPIC Appendix A in 2017, the 
problem is that SCOPIC is compensation and it is limited to a standard bonus of 25% regardless 
of the work done in protecting the environment.   An environmental award looks at the degree of 
success obtained by a salvor in protecting the environment.  
 
Taking care of the environment is now a fundamental concern.  Section 24 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa provides people with the right to a healthy and not harmful 
environment and the right to have their environment protected.176 Chapter 4 will discuss South 
Africa’s approach to compensating salvors for protecting the environment, in the light of this 
Constitutional value. 
  
                                                          
175 Gooding op cit note 96 at 6. 
176 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.section 24.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING     
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND PROTECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA  
4.1   Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the constitutional and legal framework governing environmental rights 
and protection in South Africa as the foundation for a consideration of environmental salvage.  
In South Africa section 24 of the Constitution177 deals with environmental rights under section 24 
(a) and (b) of the Constitution178 (to be discussed below in 4.2).   
The legal framework for environmental protection is provided by the National Environmental 
Management Act179 (NEMA), which came into force in 1998 to “give effect to the constitutional 
obligations and entitlement”.180 Section 2 of NEMA sets out principles that will guide the organs 
of state when making decisions that concern the environment. Section 28 of NEMA deals with the 
“duty of care” when it comes to environmental protection (to be discussed in 4.3 below). 
NEMA does not stand alone; there is also the Wreck and Salvage Act181 which deals with 
environmental salvage and the protection of the environment. The Wreck and Salvage Act 
incorporated the 1989 Salvage Convention and made a few amendments (to be discussed below in 
4.4). 
4.2   Environmental rights 
Environmental rights in South Africa are provided by section 24 of the Constitution182 and are 
made up of two parts namely, the right to the protection of the environment and the right to a 
healthy environment. Section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic reads as follows:183   
“Everyone has the right: 
   (a)   to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
(b)   to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations,  
                                                          
177 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996. 
178 Ibid. 
179 The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
180 Strydom Fuggle and Rabie’s Environmental Management in South Africa (2009) at 197. 
181 The Wreck and Salvage Act 94 of 1996.  
182 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996. 
183 Ibid. 
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through reasonable legislative and other measures that: 
    (i)   prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
    (ii)   promote conservation; and  
(iii)   secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while  
promoting justifiable economic and social development.” 
   
Both subsections 24 (a) and (b) refer to the ‘environment’, a concept that was discussed in the case 
of BP Southern Africa,184 where the court defined environment as “all conditions and influences 
affecting the life and habits of man”.185 NEMA defines the environment to mean the surroundings 
within which humans exist and that are made up of the land, water, earth, micro-organisms, plant 
and animal life.186 
Kidd submits that the environmental rights in section 24 consist of two parts as follows, the 
fundamental human rights in paragraph (a) and, in paragraph (b) a “directive principle which 
requires the state to take positive steps towards the achievement of the right.”187   
The first part of section 24 gives everyone the right to an environment which is not harmful to their 
health or well-being. The court in Woodcarb188 confirmed the common law rule to use your own 
property in such a way that you do not injure other people’s properties.189 This rule imposes a duty 
of care towards other people and their properties. Therefore, section 24 ensures that the common 
law duty of care is exercised in order to afford people an environment that will not harm their 
health or well-being. 
                                                          
184 BP Southern Africa (Pty) Limited v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment & Land Affairs, 2004 (5) SA 
124 (W). 
185 Ibid at [145]. 
186National Environmental Management Act No 107, 1998, at 63.  
 “environment means the surroundings within which humans exist and that are made up of- 
(i) the land, water and atmosphere of the earth;  
(ii) micro-organisms, plant and animal life;  
(iii) any part or combination of (i) and (ii) and the interrelationships among and between them; and  
(iv) the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and conditions of the foregoing that influence human 
health and well-being.”   
187 Kidd Environmental law 2ed (2011) at 20. 
188 The Minister of Health and Welfare v Woodcarb Pty (Ltd) 1996 (3) SA 155 (N). 
189 Ibid. 
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In Woodcarb’s190 case, the neighbours complained to the Department of Health about the emission 
of smoke from the respondent’s Rheese burner which was used to burn all non-sellable products 
of the sawmilling operation. The sawmilling plant caused serious air pollution and the respondent’s 
certificate authorising him to run the Rheese burner had expired. The court in this case granted the 
Minister of Health’s application for an interdict under the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 
45 of 1965 to stop the respondent from operating the Rheese burner. 
 Section 9 (1) of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act prevents anyone who does not have a 
registration certificate from operating in a controlled area. The court held that the discharge of 
smoke without the registration certificate was an infringement of the neighbour’s right to “an 
environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being” contained in section 29 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 [now governed by section 24 of 
the Constitution].191 
Furthermore, section 24 (a) gives the right to an environment that will not harm a person’s ‘well-
being’.  The phrase ‘well-being’ has been interpreted by our courts in HTF Developers,192 which 
held that well-being is “open-ended and manifestly …incapable of precise definition. 
Nevertheless, it is critically important in that it defines for the environmental authorities the 
constitutional objectives of their task”.193 
The court further quoted Glazewski as follows:194 
“In the environmental context, the potential ambit of a right to well-being is exciting but 
potentially limitless. The words nevertheless encompass the essence of environmental 
concern, namely a sense of environmental integrity; a sense that we ought to utilise the 
environment in a morally responsible and ethical manner. If we abuse the environment we 
                                                          
190 Ibid. 
191The Minister of Health and Welfare v Woodcarb Pty (Ltd) 1996 (3) SA 155 (N) at 164f. see also: Lone Creek River 
Lodge & Others v Global Forest Products & Others [2007] ZAGPHC 307 at 8; Lasky & Another v Showzone CC & other 
2007 (2) SA 48 (C) at [26]- [28].                         
192 HTf Developers (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2006 (5) SA 512 (T). 
193 Ibid at [18]. 
194 Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa (2000) at 86. 
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feel a sense of revulsion akin to the position where a beautiful and unique landscape is 
destroyed, or an animal is cruelly treated.” 
Glazewski points out that the term well-being includes the concepts of care for the spiritual and 
aesthetic aspect of the natural environment, as well as “sense of place”.195 This may be interpreted 
to mean that a threat or damage to the environment may affect a person’s well-being, whether the 
threat or damage occurs in a place known to that person or it occurs to a place where that person 
has never been or wishes to go in the future.196    
The second part of section 24 is subsection (b) which affords people the right to have their 
“environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable and 
other measures”. Section 24 (b) places the responsibility on the State to ensure that the environment 
is protected through reasonable and other measures for present and future generations. In 
Grootboom’s197 case the court held that the State is obliged to take “reasonable legislative and 
other measures”. The State is required to take positive actions to achieve the intended outcomes, 
programs and policies which are put into effect by the Executive.198  
 
Section 24 (b) also deals with the concept of “sustainable development”. The term sustainable 
development was dealt with by the Constitutional court in the Fuel Retailers199 case, where the 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment in Mpumalanga province granted 
authority to build a petrol station on a property in terms of section 22 (1) of the Environment 
Conservation Act, 1989 (ECA).200 
 
                                                          
195 Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa 2ed (2005) at 77. 
196 Kidd op cit note 187 at 23. Kidd gave the following example “that a person in Johannesburg may legitimately 
allege that her environmental well-being is detrimentally affected by a threat to the natural environment at St 
Lucia. This raises the idea that knowledge or reasonable anticipation of a threat to the environment anywhere may 
have an impact on a person’s environmental well-being” 
197 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
198 Ibid at [42]. 
199 Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director General: Environmental Management, Department of 
Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC). See also MEC, Department 
of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment v HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd 2008 (2) SA 319 (CC). 
200 Act 73 of 1989. 
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The Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa challenged the decision to give authority on 
grounds that the environmental authority in Mpumalanga failed to take into consideration the 
socio-economic impact of building the petrol station as obligated by section 24 of the 
Constitution.201 The court held that what is evident from section 24 is the clear recognition of the 
duty to promote justifiable “economic and social development”.202 The court further held that:203 
“The Constitution recognises the interrelationship between the environment and 
development; indeed, it recognises the need for the protection of the environment while at 
the same time it recognises the need for social and economic development. It contemplates 
the integration of environmental protection and socio-economic development. It envisages 
that environmental considerations will be balanced with socio-economic considerations 
through the ideal of sustainable development. This is apparent from section 24(b)(iii) which 
provides that the environment will be protected by securing “ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development”. Sustainable development and sustainable use and exploitation of natural 
resources are at the core of the protection of the environment.”  
 
The court went to say that:204 
 
 
“The role of the courts is especially important in the context of the protection of the 
environment and giving effect to the principle of sustainable development. The importance 
of the protection of the environment cannot be gainsaid. Its protection is vital to the 
enjoyment of the other rights contained in the Bill of Rights; indeed, it is vital to life itself. 
It must therefore be protected for the benefit of the present and future generations. The 
present generation holds the earth in trust for the next generation. This trusteeship position 
carries with it the responsibility to look after the environment. It is the duty of the court to 
ensure that this responsibility is carried out.”  
 
                                                          
201 Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director General: Environmental Management and others supra 
note 199 at [5]. 
202 Ibid at [44]. 
203 Ibid at [45]. 
204 Ibid at [102]. 
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The importance of Constitutional environmental rights was showed in the Save the Vaal205 case 
where it was held that “our Constitution by including environmental rights as fundamental, 
justiciable human rights, by necessary implication requires that environmental consideration be 
accorded appropriate recognition and respect in the administrative process in our country. Together 
with the change in the ideological climate must also come a change in our legal and administrative 
approach to environmental concerns.”206 
 
Section 24 recognizes that the right is enjoyed by everyone in the Republic and places an obligation 
on the State and environmental authorities to make decisions that are not harmful to the 
environment and people. The State is obliged to take “reasonable legislative and other measures” 
to protect the environment in terms of section 24. 
 
Section 7 (1) and (2) of the Constitution provides that the Bill of Rights is the “cornerstone of 
democracy” in the Republic and places a duty on the State to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” 
the rights contained in the Bill of Rights.207 Section 38 of the Constitution affords people in the 
Republic the right to apply to a competent court when the rights in the Bill of Rights have been 
violated or threatened.208  
 
Accordingly, it is not insufficient that South Africa has the Wreck and Salvage Act209 which 
incorporates the International Salvage Convention of 1989. All law is subject to the Constitution. 
Therefore, the standard of which one needs to evaluate our Wreck and Salvage Act is whether it 
goes far enough to promote the objectives of the Bill of Rights, specifically the environmental 
rights provided by section 24 of the Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
205 Director General: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region v Save the Vaal Environment 1999 (2) SA 709 SCA. 
206 Ibid at 719 C-D. 
207 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 108 of 1996. Section 7 (1) and (2). 
208 Ibid. section 38. 
209 94 of 1996.  
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4.3   Legal framework for environmental protection set out in NEMA 
 
 NEMA was introduced to give effect to the Constitutional obligations and it creates the legal 
framework for environmental protection in South Africa.210 NEMA gives effect to section 24 of 
the Constitution. NEMA was amended in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2009 and again in 
2014. 
 
Section 2 of NEMA places an obligation on the State to make decisions that will not affect the 
environment. Section 2 of NEMA establishes principles that will guide organs of State when 
making decisions that concern the environment which must be in the interest of the public.211  
Section 28 of NEMA is an important section because it deals with environmental compliance, 
enforcement and protection. 
 
Section 28 (1) of NEMA places a duty of care on everyone “who has caused or may cause 
significant pollution or degradation” to the environment to remedy such pollution or degradation 
by taking reasonable measures.212 Section 28 (2) of NEMA places the obligation to take 
“reasonable measures” to prevent pollution or degradation on the owner, or person in control, or a 
person who has the right to use the land or premises where an activity occurs or any other situation 
exists which causes or has caused or threatens to cause significant pollution or degradation. 
 
NEMA does not define what is meant by significant, but in the Cape Produce case,213 the court 
held “the assessment of what is significant involves … a considerable measure of subjective 
import”.214 This is more in line with International Salvage Union’s (ISU) proposal in that ISU 
proposed that substantial must be replaced with significant when defining damage to the 
environment in the International Salvage Convention. As stated in Chapter three, ISU pointed out 
that every casualty must be assessed as even the smallest casualty can pose a significant threat to 
the environment.   
                                                          
210 Strydom op cit note 180 at 197. 
211 Section 2, National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
212 Ibid, section 28 (1). 
213 Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce 2004 (2) SA 393 (E). 
214 Ibid.  
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Pollution is thereby defined in NEMA as “any change in the environment” which is caused inter 
alia by “substances … emitted from any activity … engaged in by any person …”.215  It is 
submitted that this definition could therefore cover a discharge of a substance such as oil or any 
hazardous or noxious cargo.  It is submitted that the ship owner is engaged in the activity of a ship 
voyage by sea, where there is always a possibility of a marine casualty occurring and causing 
pollution.    The full definition reads: 
“pollution means any change in the environment caused by-  
(i) substances;  
(ii) radioactive or other waves; or  
(iii) noise, odours, dust or heat,  
emitted from any activity, including the storage or treatment of waste or substances, construction 
and the provision of services, whether engaged in by any person or an organ of state, where that 
change has an adverse effect on human health or well-being or on the composition, resilience and 
productivity of natural or managed ecosystems, or on materials useful to people, or will have such 
an effect in the future” 
It is evident from the second part of the definition that one also has to consider the effect of the 
change, before it can be said to be pollution.  The change must have an adverse effect on human 
health or well-being, the eco-system, or materials useful to people, or have such adverse effect in 
future.   Some marine casualties will result in these types of adverse effect, but it would not 
necessarily apply to all marine casualties that the ISU proposal is concerned with. 
                                                          
215 Section1, National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998.  
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NEMA does not provide a definition of the term degradation. 
Kidd argues that the duty of care also places an obligation to remedy historic pollution or 
degradation. The issue historic pollution makes the requirement of section 28 practically 
unworkable.216 Historic pollution was dealt with in Bareki NO v Gencor Ltd and Others.217 The 
court in this case had to decide whether the provisions of section 28 of NEMA were retrospective. 
In Bareki’s case an application had been brought against the respondent (Gencor) for an order 
requiring him to take reasonable measures to remedy pollution or degradation to the environment 
which was caused by asbestos mining activities between 1976 and 1981. The court in this case 
held that section 28 of NEMA was not retrospective. The court went on to say that there exists a 
prima facie rule at common law against holding that a provision has a retrospective effect.218 The 
court further held that fairness was one of the deciding factors.219 
Kidd disagrees with the Bareki decision and states that the decision is wrong because it fails to 
take into consideration the fact that pollution is an ongoing process and also fails to take the correct 
account of the wording used in section 28 (1) “has caused”.220 
Section 28 (3) of NEMA sets out reasonable measures that need to be taken to meet the 
requirements set out in section 28 (1). Reasonable measures may include: 
“(a)  investigate, assess and evaluate the impact on the environment;  
 (b) inform and educate employees about the environmental risks of their work and the manner 
in which their tasks must be performed in order to avoid causing significant pollution or 
degradation of the environment;  
 (c)  cease, modify or control any act, activity or process causing the pollution or degradation;  
 (d)  contain or prevent the movement of pollutants or the causant of degradation;  
 (e)  eliminate any source of the pollution or degradation; or  
                                                          
216 Kidd op cit note 187 at 211. 
217 2006 (1) SA 432 (T). 
218 Bareki NO v Gencor Ltd and Others 2006 (1) SA 432 (T) at 438J. 
219 Ibid at 439C. 
220 Kidd op cit note 187 at 152. 
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 (f)  remedy the effects of the pollution or degradation.” 
Section 28 (4) of NEMA provides that the Director-General or provincial head must direct any 
person who fails to take such measures to comply with the duty and take such measures. Section 
28 (5) of NEMA sets out factors to be considered by the Director-General when contemplating 
any measures provided in subsection 4. Section 28 (7) of NEMA states that if any person fails to 
comply with such directive, the Director-General may take reasonable steps to recover cost or 
alternatively the Director-General may apply to the court for relief. 
In South Africa, we also have the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal 
Management Act 24 of 2008 (NEMICMA), which specifically deals with integrated coastal and 
estuarine management to promote the conservation of the coastal environment and to maintain the 
natural attributes of the coastal land and sea.  
Section 58 of NEMICMA has incorporated the duty of care that is provided in section 28 of 
NEMA. Section 58 provides that the duty of care set out in section 28 of NEMA applies, with any 
necessary changes, to any impact which is caused by any person that has an adverse effect on the 
coastal environment.221 Section 58 (1) (b) provides that “significant pollution or degradation of the 
environment” includes an adverse effect on the coastal environment and thus reference to “the 
environment” includes the coastal environment. The Minister by notice in the Government 
Gazette, may determine that an impact or activity amounts to an adverse effect until the contrary 
is proved.222 
Section 58 (2) (b) states that section 28 (1) and (2) of NEMA applies to inter alia, “the owner or 
person in charge of a vessel, aircraft, platform or structure at sea …in respect of which any activity 
                                                          
221 National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act 24 of 2008 ("NEMICMA"), section 58 
(1) (a). 
222 Ibid, section 58 (2) (a).  
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that caused or is likely to cause adverse effect occurred”223 and further applies to “any person who 
… discharged a substance which caused, is causing or is likely to cause, an adverse effect.”224 
NEMA is the broad framework which sets out principles of general application, but NEMA does 
not refer at all to ships and the coastal environment, it is restricted to land. On the other hand, 
NEMICMA goes further to include specific reference in section 58 (2) (b) to vessels that caused 
or may cause an adverse effect to the coastal environment.   Reading the two Acts together, it is 
submitted that it is clear that in a situation where a vessel casualty threatens to pollute the coastal 
environment there is a duty of care on the owner of that vessel to remedy the pollution by taking 
reasonable measures.  This may be interpreted to include marine casualties where salvors 
assistance may be required to help a vessel in distress. 
These Acts do not change the law of salvage in South Africa, nor do they affect the salvor’s rights 
to claim an award when his actions have prevented or minimised damage to the environment.   
Nevertheless, it is submitted that it is necessary to keep them in mind when considering what South 
Africa’s approach should be to the ISU’s proposal for a new environmental salvage reward.   
There has been no academic discussion of whether the duty of care in section 28 of NEMA and 
section 58 NEMICMA applies to salvage operations.  Environmental law textbooks in South 
Africa do not specifically refer to salvage.225   
                                                          
223 Section 58 (2) (b) (iii) of NEMICMA. 
224 Section 58 (2) (b) (v) of NEMICMA. 
Section 58 (2) (b) provides as follows: “the persons lo whom section 28(1) and (2) of the National Environmental 
Management Act applies must be regarded as including— 20 (i) a user of coastal public property; (ii) the owner, 
occupier, person in control of or user of land or premises on which an activity that caused or is likely to cause an 
adverse effect occurred, is occurring or is planned; (iii) the owner or person in charge of a vessel, aircraft, platform 
or structure 25 at sea, or the owner or driver of a vehicle, in respect of which any activity that caused or is likely to 
cause an adverse effect occurred, is occurring or is planned; (iv) the operator of a pipeline that ends in the coastal 
zone: or (v) any person who produced or discharged a substance which caused, is 30 causing or is likely to cause, 
an adverse effect.” 
225 Example: Kidd Environmental law 2ed (2011); Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa (2000); Glazewski 
Environmental Law in South Africa 2ed (2005); Fuggle & Rabie’s Environmental Management in South Africa (2009; 
Du Plessis Environmental Law and Local Government in South Africa (2015); Paterson Environmental Compliance 
and Enforcement in South Africa Legal Perspective (2009). 
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It is submitted that this is an oversight. ISU’s argument that salvors are the only persons with the 
equipment, personnel and expertise to immediately respond to marine casualties and prevent 
marine environmental pollution is a strong one. Unless we consider means to encourage salvors 
(considering that salvors act voluntarily226), it is submitted that we may be losing an important 
opportunity to promote the objectives of protecting the marine environment. 
4.4 The Wreck and Salvage Act 
NEMA does not stand alone, there is also Wreck and Salvage Act227 that deals specifically with 
salvage, environmental salvage and the protection of the environment. It is recognized that the 
Wreck and Salvage is only one piece of legislation. This is an area where there are many Acts228 
that deal with pollution from ships (which could be caused by marine casualties, or which can arise 
through other means like accidental and operational discharges).  However, only the Wreck and 
Salvage Act considers the rights and compensation payable to salvors for protecting the 
environment. 
 
The Wreck and Salvage Act incorporated the 1989 Salvage Convention and made the following 
amendments: 
Section 2 (6) of the Wreck and Salvage Act provides that salvage includes “any fixed or floating 
platform or any mobile offshore drilling unit whether or not it is engaged in the exploration, 
exploitation or production of sea-bed mineral resources”. Hare submits that section 2 (6) of the 
was included in the Wreck and Salvage Act to extend the requirements contained therein by 
Article 1 (c) of the 1989 Salvage Convention.229  
 
                                                          
226 There is a common law requirement that a salvor needs to act voluntarily. The position is different for the 
National Port Authority and other State authorities if they are acting under a duty.  See mv Cleopatra Dream 
Transnet Ltd t/a National Ports Authority v mv Cleopatra Dream and Another 2011 (5) SA 613 (SCA) at [55]. 
227 Wreck and Salvage Act 94 of 1996.  
228 For a discussion of the Acts covering marine pollution see Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa 2ed 
(2005), chapter 23. 
229 Hare op cit note 67 at 404. 
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Section 2 (7) of the Wreck and Salvage Act provides that: 
 
“Damage to the environment as defined in article 1 of the Convention shall for purposes of 
this Act, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, not be restricted 
to coastal or inland waters or to areas adjacent thereto, but shall apply to any place where 
such damage may occur.” 
 
Section 2 (7) provides that “damage to the environment” has no restrictions, that it shall apply to 
any place where damage to the environment takes place. This is line with ISU’s proposal in Article 
1 (d) of the proposed Convention, that there is no need for geographical limits when dealing with 
the environment.  
 
Section 2 (8) of the Wreck and Salvage Act provides: 
 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of article 14(3) of the Convention, for the purposes of this 
Act, the expression “fair rate” means a rate of remuneration which is fair having regard to 
the scope of the work and to the prevailing market rate, if any, for work of a similar nature”     
 
According to the South African Wreck and Salvage Act Article 14 includes an element of profit. 
Hare, with reference to section 6 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983, argues 
that where the Wreck and Salvage Act is silent on issues regarding Article 14 special compensation 
the English Law of Salvage as at 1 November 1983 will apply.230  The contrary view, expressed 
by Wallis, is that a term in a South African statute does not need to be interpreted in a manner 
bound by English law.231  This is not to say that the court cannot consider English law in deciding 
how it will interpret the provision.  As stated in chapter two the House of Lords decision in the 
Nagasaki Spirit232 case went against the interpretation of fair rate which is set out in section 2 (8) 
of the Wreck and Salvage Act and held that fair rates for expenditure and equipment used in the 
                                                          
230Hare op cit note 67 at 401. 
231 Wallis The Associated Ship and South African Admiralty Jurisdiction (2010) at 75, footnote 100 where the author 
states that it has been ‘a curious feature’ of South African jurisprudence to interpret South African statutes with 
reference to section 6. 
232 The Nagasaki Spirit supra at note 11. 
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salvage operation did not include an element of profit.  The decision and reasoning of the Nagasaki 
Spirit case clearly does not apply in South Africa, by virtue of section 2 (8) of the Wreck and 
Salvage Act. 
 
However, the Wreck and Salvage Act does not go as far as ISU’s proposal. First, with regards to 
Article 14 (3) fair rates, the ISU proposal is not simply considering introducing a ‘profit’ element 
for the services, but is proposing the introduction of an entirely new, separate reward which could 
be much higher.  Secondly, this reward would not be payable only when an article 13 reward is 
not earned or is lower than the special compensation, which is the position under the International 
Salvage Convention and the Wreck and Salvage Act.  The ISU environmental reward would be 
payable in addition to an Article 13 reward.  
 
Although the Wreck and Salvage Act does not go as far as the ISUI proposal it does benefit salvors.  
In terms of section 2 (8) of the Wreck and Salvage Act a salvor can claim profit which is not 
limited to a standard bonus of 25 % like SCOPIC.  Therefore, it is submitted that section 2 (8) of 
the Wreck and Salvage Act is a step closer to achieving the objective of incentivising salvors which 
is the basis of the ISU’s proposal.    
 
                                  The Mbashi 
There is one reported decision which has applied the provisions of the Wreck and Salvage Act, the 
Mbashi case..233 The case will not be discussed in detail because it deals mainly with whether 
services were rendered voluntarily or not; and because the salvage operation was successful the 
case did not discuss how special compensation (and a fair rate) is to be calculated. 
 
A fire broke out in the vessel’s engine room and the master sent out a radio signal to the Durban 
authorities. The court held that Transnet was entitled to a salvage reward, because Transnet 
responded to a call of a vessel that was in distress, which was outside the harbour.  Therefore, 
Transnet was immune to section 5(4) of the Wreck and Salvage Act.234   The court held after 
                                                          
233 Transnet Ltd v MV Mbashi and Others 2002 (3) SA 217 (D). 
234 Ibid at [225] [H]-[J]. 
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considering the factors referred to in article 13 that a fair reward would be 2,5% of R128 498 
396,04, being the values of the ship, containers, bunker fuel and cargo.   
 
Although the case did not discuss special compensation its raises an interesting point of principle.  
The court held235 that “whilst the Court is enjoined to grant rewards which encourage salvors to 
rescue ships in distress, one should guard against the notion that rewards should be unduly 
burdensome to ship owners, cargo owners and other interests.” 
 
The court in Mbashi’s case recognized the importance of rewarding salvors to encourage them to 
help vessels in distress, however, the court cautioned that the calculation of a salvage reward must 
not place shipowners and cargo interests in an unfair position of having to pay huge rewards.  
Therefore, it is submitted that ISU’s proposal can be criticized that it does not strike a balance and 
it could be unduly burdensome to shipowners and cargo interests. An environmental award cannot 
be quantified, such an award will be speculative and be by “guess or God”236 which might result 
in huge awards being awarded to salvors thereby causing a disadvantage to everyone who is liable 
to pay for them.  Further an environmental award based on too many uncertainties will probably 
result in lengthy and expensive litigation which will not be in the interest of the public. Bishop, 
however, submits that the proposed change is not intended to amount in huge rewards. This will 
encourage salvors to invest in the future and better equipment which will help them remain in 
business.237 
 
4.5    Conclusion 
In South Africa, environmental rights and protection are governed by section 24 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa238, which provides that everyone has a right to an environment 
which will not harm their health or well-being; and section 28 of NEMA which gives effect to 
section 24 of the Constitution, provides that everyone who has caused or will cause environmental 
pollution or degradation must take reasonable measures to remedy such pollution or degradation. 
                                                          
235 Ibid [230] [D]-[H]. 
236 Howard op cit note 162 at 3. 
237 Bishop op cit note 3 at 98. 
238 108 of 1996. 
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Both the Constitution and NEMA place an obligation on the State to make decisions that will not 
cause harm to the environment. NEMA does not stand alone, in South Africa we also have Wreck 
and Salvage Act, which deals with salvage, and environmental salvage and the protection of the 
environment.  
 
Although the Wreck and Salvage Act incorporated the 1989 Salvage Convention with certain 
amendments, as discussed above, it is submitted the Wreck and Salvage Act does not go as far as 
ISU’s proposal. It is submitted that the environmental right enshrined in the Constitution requires 
South Africa to consider enacting legislation that would provide a stronger incentive to salvors to 
protect the environment for the benefit of present and future generations.  However, this is an area 
of law in which it is desirable to have international uniformity.  This is discussed further in the 
recommendations put forward in chapter 5. 
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                              CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION  
5.1   Introduction  
The purpose of this dissertation is to critically analyze the International Salvage Union’s (ISU) 
proposed amendments of the 1989 Salvage Convention and to consider whether this should be 
incorporated into the South African Wreck and Salvage Act, 1996. 
 
5.2   Summary of the findings 
In chapter two, Article 13 (1) (b) and 14 of the 1989 Salvage Convention, the Special 
Compensation P & I Club Clause (SCOPIC) and the Nagasaki Spirit case239 were discussed. It is 
evident that salvage is an ancient right which has been concerned with the saving of life and 
property at sea, according to the principle of “no cure no pay”.  
It was only when the 1989 Salvage Convention was introduced that it drafters took an initiative 
and introduced two changes to the law to protect the environment. Article 13(1)(b) which looks at 
the skill and effort of the salvors in preventing or minimizing damage to the environment when 
calculating a salvage reward and   Article 14 which provides a for special compensation even when 
no property has been saved, but the salvor has prevented or minimized damage to the environment. 
The 1989 Salvage Convention thus reduced the harshness of the principle of “no cure no pay”.240  
Difficulties came with the House of Lords decision in the Nagasaki Spirit case241 that fair rates for 
the equipment, and personnel actually and reasonably used in the salvage operation did not include 
an element of profit.242 Article 14 was thereafter replaced by SCOPIC which can be incorporated 
in the LOF salvage contract. 
In chapter three, ISU’s proposal for an environmental award was examined and the issues 
regarding the assessment of such an award were considered.  In 2007 ISU put forward a proposal 
for an environmental salvage award which was followed by their position paper in 2012, in which 
                                                          
239 The Nagasaki Spirit supra note 11. 
240 Bishop op cit note 3 at 67. 
241 The Nagasaki Spirit supra note 11. 
242 Ibid at 332. 
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ISU believed it was time for change. ISU wanted the 1989 Salvage Convention to be amended to 
make way for a new environmental salvage award because the present systems under the 1989 
Salvage Convention and where applicable SCOPIC do not properly recognize the salvors’ efforts 
in protecting the environment.243 ISU acknowledges that in many cases salvors are rewarded for 
protecting the environment under article 13 (1) (b), but because of the low value of the salved 
property the tribunal cannot give full effect to this provision. ISU argued that both Article14 and 
SCOPIC’s main goal is to save property and they are not a method of remuneration but a “safety 
net”.244     
Ex-president Todd Busch then went on to give three reasons for their environmental salvage award 
proposal. First, he said that environmental issues are dominant in every salvage case. Secondly, 
that the current system under the 1989 Salvage Convention and where applicable SCOPIC do not 
take into account the degree of success obtained by the salvor in protecting the environment. 
Thirdly, that the salvage industry lacks funding.245  
 
ISU further stated that in order to achieve an environmental salvage award Article 1 (d), 13 and 14 
needed to be amended as follows: 
 
In defining “damage to the environment” in the revised Article 1(d), ISU proposed that 
“significant” must replace “substantial” because they consider “significant” to be a more realistic 
measure when it comes to environmental concerns.246 Secondly, ISU proposed that the 
geographical restriction “in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto” be removed from 
the current definition, because when it comes to the environment there is no need for geographical 
limits.247 
 
ISU’s proposal involves very little change to the current Article 13. ISU has proposed that Article 
13 (1) (b) must be deleted and be incorporated to the revised article 14.248 In terms of the revised 
                                                          
243 ISU’s Position Paper op cit note 17 at 1.  
244 Busch op cit note 19 at 4. 
245 ISU’s Position Paper op cit note 17 at 1. 
246 ibid at 4. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid at 5. 
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Article 14 (1) if the salvor has carried out a salvage operation in respect of a ship which threatened 
damage to the environment, the salvor shall be entitled to an environmental award which is to be 
paid in addition to a reward which the salvor is entitled to receive under Article 13. ISU is of the 
view that this award is fixed to encourage salvors to prevent and minimize damage to the 
environment. ISU proposed that such an award must be paid by the shipowner and his liability 
insurers.249 ISU believes that a competent Tribunal that poses the required skill and knowledge 
will be able to handle the assessment of an environmental award.250 
ISU’s proposal was opposed by shipowner’s and P & I Clubs, they argued that they were happy 
with SCOPIC and that an environmental award cannot be quantified therefore making difficult to 
calculate.251 The marine property underwriters provided a possible alternative solution on how an 
environmental salvage award can be calculated.  They suggest that for such an award to be possible 
it must be based upon the SCOPIC tariff system and controlled by the Special Casualty 
Representative (SCR).252 With regards to the issue that only shipowners are liable to pay for an 
environmental award, Khosla disagrees with ISU and submits that there is a shared responsibility 
by shipowners, cargo interests, government and the public for the environment and its protection 
and that oil pollution is not the only pollutant.253 
Chapter four discussed the Constitutional and legal framework governing environmental rights 
and protection in South Africa. Section 24 of the Constitution of South Africa provides 
environmental rights in South Africa and afford the people the right to an environment that is not 
harmful to their health or well-being and the right to have their environment protected. The legal 
framework for environmental protection in South Africa is created by National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) and was introduced to give effect to the Constitutional 
obligations.254 NEMA gives effect to section 24 of the Constitution. Section 28 (1) of NEMA 
places a duty of care on everyone “who has caused or may cause significant pollution or 
degradation” to the environment to remedy such pollution or degradation by taking reasonable 
                                                          
249 Ibid. 
250 ISU’s position paper op cit note 17 at 7.  
251 Khosla op cit note 23. 
252 Gooding op cit note 96 at 6. 
253 ibid at 8. 
254 Strydom op cit note 180 at 197. 
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measures.255 We also have the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal 
Management Act 24 of 2008 (NEMICMA), which deals with integrated coastal and estuarine 
management to promote the conservation of the coastal environment and to maintain the natural 
attributes of the coastal land and sea. Section 58 of NEMICMA deals with the duty of care and has 
incorporated the duty of care that is provided in section 28 of NEMA. NEMA does not stand alone, 
there is also Wreck and Salvage Act 94 of 1996 that deals specifically with salvage, environmental 
salvage and the protection of the environment. The Wreck and Salvage Act incorporated the 1989 
Salvage Convention and amended section 2 (6), 2 (7) and 2 (8).  
 
5.3   Recommendations 
Although the Wreck and Salvage Act incorporated the 1989 Salvage Convention with certain 
amendments, as discussed above, it is submitted the Wreck and Salvage Act does not go as far as 
ISU’s proposal. The environmental rights enshrined in the Constitution require us to enact 
legislation that would provide a stronger incentive to salvors to protect the environment for the 
benefit of present and future generations. Therefore, it is submitted that ISU’s proposal is one 
South Africa should consider supporting.  At present the ISU proposal does not have sufficient 
support yet to create an amendment to the International Salvage Convention.  It is undesirable for 
there to be a lack of international uniformity in this area of law. Hare points out that the stated 
objective of the Salvage Convention256 is to introduce uniformity in the international law of 
salvage and that the Wreck and Salvage Act was enacted to bring South African law into line with 
the international rules.257 He further points out that the common law of salvage is only changed to 
the extent set out in the Convention.258 Therefore, South Africa must not, it is submitted, amend 
the Wreck and Salvage Act unless ISU’s proposal has been adopted at an international level. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
255 section 28 (1) of NEMA. 
256 The Preamble to the Convention states that the drafters were “Recognizing the desirability of determining by 
agreement uniform international rules 
regarding salvage operations.”  
257 Hare op cit note 67 at 402-403. 
258 Ibid. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
ISU has proposed that the 1989 Salvage Convention be amended to create a separate 
environmental award because the current system under the 1989 Salvage Convention or SCOPIC, 
if applicable, do not properly reward salvors for protecting the environment. ISU proposed that an 
environmental award be paid in addition to Article 13. In South Africa, the Wreck and Salvage 
Act deals the right and compensation of salvors and section 2 (8) affords salvors a right to recover 
a profit. However, the Wreck and Salvage Act does not go as far as ISU’s proposal.  It is submitted 
that South Africa must support ISU’s proposal, because the Constitution provides that the rights 
in the Bill of Rights must be fulfilled and this includes environmental rights in section 24. The 
difficulty with incorporating ISU’s proposal into our own legislation is that presently it lacks 
uniformity as it has not been adopted internationally.  
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